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ABSTRACT 
Khan, Faraz Moving Forward from the Arab Spring: Predicting the Level of Democracy in a  
Nation Post-Revolution. Department of Economics, June 2013.  
ADVISOR: Lewis S. Davis 
The Arab Spring consisted of a series of revolutions throughout the Arab world that 
attempted to remove dictatorial powers and institute democratic reform. However, the events 
after the Arab Spring beg the question of whether these nations will achieve their intended ends. 
Various factors have been identified to affect the level of democracy in nation including income 
levels, colonization history, and income inequality, among others. However, recent literature 
focuses on the role that cultural values play in affecting the development of political institutions. 
Cultural values play an interesting role during political disequilibrium. Revolutions represent the 
breakdown of formal institutions. During this time, prior research finds that people use informal 
institutions (culture) to guide their decision making. The level of democracy after a revolution 
should be highly affected by the cultural values on the people within a nation. Using an OLS and 
two stage least squares approach, I develop models to predict the level of democracy after a 
period of political disequilibrium. The PolityIV database marks points of disequilibrium using 
special measures based on foreign intervention, anarchy and political transition. The average 
level of democracy after disequilibrium can be predicted with a model using various explanatory 
variables including income per capita, colonization history, income inequality and culture. Using 
instruments for cultural values, we find that values such as individualism have a significant 
impact on the level of democracy after a period of political disequilibrium.  
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Section I: Introduction 
 In an unprecedented set of events and coincidence, the Arab world exploded. With the 
suicide of fruit vendor Mohamed Bouazizi, the Arab World began what is expected to be a slow 
transition toward institutional change. The people in Arab nations have expressed their desire for 
more democracy through the World Value Surveys. However, prior to the recent Arab Spring 
revolutions, the Arab World was controlled by a few men in stable autocracies or in established 
monarchies. The Arab Spring countries hope to transition from these autocratic regimes toward 
democracies and more political accountability. Major political transitions have occurred in 
Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen while protests/uprisings are currently taking place in Bahrain, 
Syria, Algeria, Jordan, Morocco and Iraq.  
In Tunisia, former President Zine El Abidne Ben Ali was removed from power in January 
of 2011 after a 24 year reign. Hosni Mubarak maintained control of Egypt for 30 years until 
February of 2011. After 18 days of protest in Egypt, Mubarak was ousted from his role as 
president. The Libyan revolution was a little more complex than the other Arab Spring 
movements. Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was removed from power after 34 years in power. He 
was killed during the subsequent fighting after NATO deployed troops to aid anti-government 
forces in October of 2011. The other major transition occurred in Yemen. Former President Ali 
Abdullah Saleh was removed from power in 2012 after a reign of 22 years in the unified Yemen. 
He was removed in February 2012 and granted immunity from prosecution. In each of these 
nations, higher levels of unemployment, political censorship and income inequality all seem to 
be the major forces causing political disequilibrium.  
The successful elections of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Al Nahda 
(Renaissance) party in Tunisia have represented the movement toward more democratic political 
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institutions. However, questions remain considering the role of these moderate Islamic 
governments moving into the future. Democracy is not, as some believe, a political system that 
nations either have or do not have. On August 19, 2012, the newly elected President of Egypt, 
Mohamed Morsi, removed the leader of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) in 
Egypt. President Morsi, who had been in a struggle with the SCAF for control of the nation, 
established unilateral control of the Egyptian government and began to place Muslim 
Brotherhood members into unfilled positions within the government. These actions raise the 
question of what level of democracy the people within this Arab Spring nation obtained.  
The recent developments in some Arab Spring nations and past history teach us to 
exercise caution when determining the impact the Arab Spring will have on the nations in the 
region. In 1933, the Vaps Movement in Estonia was voted into power after prior attempts to 
remove the parliament. The leaders of the movement overhauled the government and put in its 
place a presidential system of government. However, an authoritarian style “democracy” was put 
in place of the parliament. A coup in Brazil in 1964 removed then President Goulart. General 
Castello Branco replaced Goulart and became a de facto dictator of the nation. The current 
political transitions have the possibility of allowing more unsavory political actors to gain power, 
but may also allow more stable government institutions to take hold.  
In Egypt, the fear is that a tyrant was removed only so that another can fill the current 
void in power. Nations such as Argentina and early 19th century France has had to deal with 
wavering between weak democracies, oligarchies, monarchies and dictators. Determining what 
level of democracy after a point of political disequilibrium requires an analysis of various factors 
including income levels, colonization history, and cultural values, among others. Specific 
attention will be paid to how culture affects the level of democracy after a political transition. In 
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many of these nations, cultural norms aid people in making decisions because of the lack of 
quality formal institutions. After political transitions, governments are not completely in place 
and formal institutions are not able to guide people’s actions. In these situations, culture would 
seem to matter more. A preliminary look at Figure 1 supports these claims.  
 According to Figure 1 in the appendix, we see that there is value in studying the factors 
that affect of different variables on post-transitional democracy. Some level of variability can be 
explained by the models that are developed in this study. Culture may explain a major portion of 
the variability in post-transitional levels of democracy. Along with other factors such as 
economic development, colonization history and natural resource abundance, we can develop a 
model to explain that variability in post-transitional democracy.  
 The following chapters outline the existing literature on determinants of democracy 
followed by analysis of the role of culture. In section II, I outline the factors that other research 
has found to be important in determining the level of democracy in a nation. I also introduce the 
role that culture plays in affecting political institutions. In Section III, I break down the data that 
I use to measure culture and democracy. I also introduce the other variables that I include in my 
analysis. In Section IV, I introduce the results of my analysis including both OLS and IV models. 
I also attempt to predict the level of democracy in some nations currently undergoing political 
disequilibria. In Section V, I conclude my analysis and look to what work can be done in the 
future.  
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Section II: Literature Review of Determinants of Democracy 
The level of democracy after a revolution may be affected by many factors. Past work, 
however, has focused on the equilibrium democracy within nations, not the level of democracy 
after disequilibrium. Research in the past has shown that there are four distinct periods of 
democratization. The initial wave of democratization spanned from 1800 to 1920. In this time, 
nations such as Argentina and Chile were fighting off colonizing nations. Furthermore, France 
was embroiled in the French Revolution and the following reign of terror. This period represents 
the initial stage of democratization. The second stage of democratization occurred between 1920 
and 1944. This period is marked as the “Interwar” period. During this time, the Ottoman Empire 
was broken into separate nations such as Albania and Greece. Along with the creation of new 
states, fascism was spreading through some states in Europe after World War I and taking hold 
in Italy. The fascism revolutions and the early formation of new states in the Mediterranean and 
in Northern Africa mark the “Interwar” period. The “Pre-Cold War” era was between 1944 and 
1989. During this period, a rapid stretch of decolonization occurred as high income nations such 
as Britain and France were ravaged by the effects of World War II. Furthermore, during this 
period, the USSR rose to power and subsequently fell. As these new nations formed, some 
underwent periods of anarachy and revolution. For example, Ghana was officially recognized as 
a sovereign nation in 1960. In 1969, the first parliamentary elections occurred in Ghana since the 
coup that brought the National Liberation Council into power in 1966. After these elections, 
another coup took place in 1975 in which the Supreme Military Council took power. In 1978, 
other military leaders took action against the Supreme Military Council and overthrew the 
leaders. The nation was then transitioned into free elections for the first time since its formation. 
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Links between income levels and democracy were originally established but have 
recently been under scrutiny after the use of instrumental variable techniques. Other literature 
studies the relationship between weak political institutions and natural resources within nations. 
The presence of natural resources was exploited by colonizing nations. These colonizing nations 
were through to put in place weak institutions that persist through time. Both ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization and income inequality have also thought to play a significant role in the 
development of democratic institutions. During points of equilibrium, government institutions 
are highly persistent; however, revolutions present an opportunity for institutional change.   
More recent literature on the development of political institutions looks at the role that 
cultural values play in establishing democratic institutions. Empirically derived instruments have 
been used to determine a causal link between cultural values such as individualism, “civic” 
culture and the prevalence of democracy. However, the link between culture and the level of 
democracy after a revolution has not been studied.  
Section A: Income Levels and Education 
 Lipset (1959) uses simple correlation analysis to determine the types of conditions that 
are necessary for democracy. He did not look at the specific level of democracy; however, he did 
divide the data based on the language and whether or not the democracy in a country was stable 
or unstable. Lipset looks into various measures of income, literacy and urbanization and their 
correlation with stable democratic institutions. European nations with stable democracies have 
higher levels of income per capita, a more literate population and higher levels of urbanization. 
He purports that a more educated population allows nations a better chance at having a stable 
democracy. Furthermore, Lipset supports the idea that organized democracy is a result of having 
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cities and an urban life. Lipset states that a social climate in which the population is educated, 
has a high level of income per capita and is urbanized is more likely to have a stable democracy. 
These are all considered to be the “social requisites” of democracy. Interestingly, Lipset points to 
the ability of an educated population to incite the entire nation in a movement toward democracy.   
However, more recent research by Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared (2008) 
found no causal link between income and democracy. Because of the possible reverse causality 
between the level of democracy (as defined by the Freedom House Index) and the income per 
capita, Acemoglu et al use the savings rate from the past five years as the instrument for the log 
of GDP per capita. The savings rate from the past is thought to affect income, and provide no 
reason why savings rate would affect the democracy within a nation. A strong relationship was 
found between the savings rate and the log GDP per capita. However, no relationship was found 
between the instrumented log GDP per capita and the Freedom House index of democracy.  
 Benhabib,	   Corvalan and Spiegel (2011) attempted to reestablish a link between 
democracy and income. Using the expanded Maddison income database and a limited-dependent 
econometric model, Benhabib et al are able to show that higher income per capita are correlated 
with higher levels of democracy. The research contends that because democracy indices are 
truncated at either end (-X to X), the linear relationship between the democracy and income is 
masked. Furthermore, by using an expanded dataset, more within country observations are used 
and the relationship is robust to the inclusion of country fixed effects. A lagged income is used as 
the independent variable; however, the question of reverse causality is not answered in this 
analysis as no instrument is proposed. Because there is such a debate over whether income plays 
a real role in affected the prevalence and level of democracy, it would be wise to include it in our 
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analysis. There is still a possible link between the two and leaving the variable out may bias the 
results.  
Section B: Natural Resources 
 Other factors have been thought to affect not only political institutions within a nation but 
also on economic growth. One major player in the development of economic and political 
institutions is the prevalence of natural resources (minerals, oil, etc.). Countries with high levels 
of natural resources have performed poorly economically leading economists to coin the phrase 
“The Curse of Natural Resources.” Sachs and Warner (2001) empirically test the resource curse 
using exports of natural resources as an independent predictor of GDP growth. Furthermore, they 
control for geographic factors such as distance to the nearest port, the percent of land in the 
tropics and others. Using these controls, Sachs and Warner find the natural resource abundance is 
negatively related to economic growth. Natural resources are thought to lead to rent seeking 
behavior on the part of authority figures. Natural resources, while thought to play a role in 
modern society, also played a role in the distant colonial history. 
 Some work by political scientists Jensen and Wantchekon (2004) looks at the correlation 
between the levels of democracy in African nations and the size of the natural resource sector. 
They argue that natural resources affect democratic transition and the success of democratic 
consolidation. Using regression analysis, Barro (1999) uses natural resources as a determinant of 
democracy. Barro includes a dummy variable for oil exporters (based on IMF categorization) 
when attempting to predict the level of democracy within nations. He finds that nations that 
heavily rely on natural resources have lower levels of democracy. Barro, however, uses the 
Freedom House Index and looks at recent levels of democracy (1972 – 1995). Natural resource 
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abundance is thought to affect the decision making process of government figures and decreases 
the pressure for human and physical capital accumulation. It would be wise to include natural 
resources in our analysis of post-revolutionary democracy considering it plays a role in 
equilibrium democracy.  
Section C: Colonization 
Colonization efforts were undertaken mainly by Europeans and have been thought to 
have an effect on modern day institutions. In an attempt to explain the variation in output per 
worker around the world among various nations, Hall and Jones (1999) look toward a variable 
they coin as social infrastructure. Social infrastructure includes institutions (economic, political) 
and government policies. Hall and Jones construct a measure of social infrastructure known as 
government anti-diversion policy based on law and order, bureaucratic quality, corruption, risk 
of expropriation and government repudiation of contracts. Because of the possible endogeneity 
issue in using social infrastructure as an explanatory variable for product ivity, Hall and Jones 
use an instrumental variable approach. The distance from the equator is used as a geographic 
instrument for social infrastructure. This instrument, along with others outlined in their research, 
explain a large portion of the constructed social infrastructure variable. Distance from the 
equator also does not affect the productivity of workers now. Hall and Jones theorize that 
distance from the equator played a role in the historical development of social institutions as a 
result of influence by Western Europeans. 
 Acemoglu, Robinson and Johnson (2001) studied the varying policies of colonizers 
within respective colonized nations. Acemoglu et al look at the role that institutions play in the 
huge divergence in income per capita among the nations of the world. By exploiting some new 
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data on the mortality rates of settlers in new colonies, they are able to make a link between the 
policies of colonization, the quality of institutions now and ultimately, economic performance. 
They state that colonial policies favored extraction or investment. In nations with higher levels of 
settler mortality, colonizing nations were likely to set up extractive settlements that were focused 
on resource extraction. These policies of extraction resulted in poor institutional quality during 
the colonial era. Those nations with low levels of settler mortality; however, were set up with 
strong institutions such as property rights and rule of law. Acemoglu et al theorize that those past 
institutions, whether poor or strong, persist through time and can account for some of the 
difference in income per capita among nations. Furthermore, Acemoglu et al relate the settler 
morality to early (1900) government institutions (democracy) through a measure on the 
“constraints of the executive.” They find that differences in settler mortality explain 50% of the 
variation in early institutions. This variable is considered to be a measure of the quality of 
democratic institutions. The settler mortality measure is based on colonial era data concerning 
the deaths of soldiers and priests in settlements. The settler mortality is used as an instrument for 
the average protection against expropriation, a measure of modern day institutions. The mortality 
is highly negatively correlated with the protection against expropriation risk. These modern 
institutions result in higher levels of income per capita. The colonial excursions of western 
Europeans, as evidenced by Acemoglu et al (2001), were based on either natural resource 
abundance within nations or a desire to nation-build. The presence of poor institutions in nations 
that were colonized for natural resources also plays a role in supporting higher levels of 
inequality within nations. 
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Section D: Income Inequality 
Inequality is thought to exist based on not only colonial history affecting institutional 
quality, but also the presence of rent seeking behavior as a result of natural resource abundance. 
Sokoloff and Engerman (2000), based on chronicles of colonial history, look into the relative 
factor endowments (climate, natural resources, soil etc.) of nations during the colonial era. 
During the colonial period, nations in the Caribbean with favorable factor endowments had the 
highest income per capita. In these nations, land was abundant and the marginal product of labor 
was large. The use of slaves was prevalent as large plantations were necessary to growth cash 
crops. The New World began to specialize in the production and distribution of sugar, coffee and 
other cash crops. The high volume of slaves in the New World colonies resulted in an unequal 
distribution of income. This was also seen in territories that had high mineral output in which 
few colonizers controlled vast amounts of land for natural resource extraction. Nations with 
small native populations and few factor endowments (US, Canada) grew based on the human 
capital provided males of European descent. Slavery was not as wide spread, and income 
distribution was more equal in these territories.  
To test Sokoloff and Engerman’s theory of development, Easterly (2007) uses an 
instrument that takes into account factor endowments. Easterly uses the log of the wheat to sugar 
ratio as an instrument for the Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient is a measure of income 
inequality that has been used throughout the literature but does face some criticism. The 
instrumented Gini coefficient is then used to measure the effect of exogenous income inequality 
of development measures such as secondary enrollment and income per capita. Furthermore, 
Easterly looks into the role the inequality plays in affecting different institutions including the 
rule of law, political stability, freedom from corruption and government effectiveness. He finds 
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that inequality is strong predictor of institutional quality and that institutional quality has an 
effect of development.  
Democracy can also come through revolution, often violent, against the ruling elite in 
attempt to redistribute economic wealth. Polybius, in Volume VI of The Histories, presents the 
concept of Anacyclosis. He states that political transitions go from benign forms of government 
such as monarchy, aristocracy and democracy into malignant forms such as tyranny, oligarchy 
and “mob-rule.” In his theory, he states that nations start with monarchy which degrades into 
tyranny as leaders begin to take advantage of their status. In an attempt to remove the corrupt 
leader, a small group of aristocrats overthrow the tyrant and take control of the nations. 
However, these aristocrats begin abuse their power. The masses of people will remove the 
aristocrats and establish a democracy. 
 This presentation of democracy fits the colonial narrative in which few ruling elite 
controlled much of the land and economic power within colonies. Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2001) present a game theoretic model of political transition based on oscillating oppressive and 
democratic regimes in Latin America and the history of political institutions in western 
civilizations. Similar to the other model by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), the lower class can 
threaten revolution in an attempt to redistribute income in society. However, the elite have an 
incentive to mount of a coup against the democratically elected government in an attempt to 
regain the redistributed income. Higher levels of income inequality can result in government 
oscillating between oppressive oligarchies and democratic governments. Inequality, according to 
Acemoglu and Robinson, is the key to determining whether or not a democracy consolidates 
after revolution. The lower class can choose to revolt and can seize the income with in a nation 
post revolution. The lower class can also choose not to revolt, and accept the tax redistributed 
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income of the upper class. Intense asset redistribution, such as land reform, increases the 
likelihood of the former elite mounting a coup against the consolidated democracy.  
Section E: Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 
Most of the focus in the literature involving democratic revolutions revolves around 
income inequality. However, nations with high levels of income inequality have also had to deal 
with huge ethnic divisions. These ethnic divisions can play a huge role in preventing revolutions 
from occurring as it is harder to overcome the collective action problem outlined in the models 
by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001). Using ethnolinguistic diversity as an explanatory 
variable, Easterly and Levine (1997) find that high levels of ethnic diversity are associated with 
low schooling, political instability, and insufficient infrastructure. A data set was used measuring 
the probability that two randomly chosen individuals within a nation will be from two different 
ethnolinguistic tribes. Easterly and Levine theorize that more ethnolinguistic diversity results in 
more polarization in the population and leads to rent-seeking. Those within a specific ethnic 
group will not favor public goods necessary for long term growth. In an extension of the ethnic 
diversity studies, Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat and Wacziarg (2003) use different, 
more expansive measures of ethnic fractionalization to study quality of institutions and growth. 
They find that ethnic and linguistic fractionalization is a strong predictor of the quality of 
institutions and economic growth. However, they also find that there is a high level of 
multicollinearity in standard least squares between the explanatory variables. There is a 
possibility that ethnic fractionalization is endogenous. However, Alesina et al state that the time 
period they use does not allow for changes in ethnicity. The variation in ethnicity may result in 
an increase rent seeking behavior and ineffective institutions.  
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Section F: Previous Levels of Democracy 
 Barro (1999) introduced another factor that may have a significant effect on the level of 
democracy after a revolution. He attempts to determine the factors that affect equilibrium 
democracy using panel data from 1960 to 1995. Barro uses the 5 and 10 year lag of the level of 
democracy as an explanatory variable for democracy and finds that both are significant 
regressors in his models. He states that nations with more experience with democracy are more 
likely to be democratic. Using the previous level of democracy, I determine if transitions truly 
have an impact on the level of democracy.  
 Persson and Tabellini (2009) study the effects of “democratic capital” on the exit rate of 
nations from democracy and autocracy. Deemocratic capital refers to a nation’s previous 
historical experience with democracy. Persson and Tabellini contend that respect for a 
democratic system of governance is necessary for consolidation. When the citizens within a 
nation have more experience with democracy, there is less possibility of a successful military 
coup. The respect that citizens have for democracy is coined as democratic capital by Persson 
and Tabellini; however, it may point to a cultural inclination toward a democratic form of rule. 
As opposed to being an accumulation of experience, the people within a nation may be more 
inclined to respect individual choice and decision making, which is important in making 
democracy successful. Persson and Tabellini use the Polity IV index and divide up nations into 
autocracies (0 if a negative score in the Polity IV index) and democracies (1 if a positive score in 
Polity IV index). Using this index for measuring historical levels of democracy, they find that a 
high democratic capital (more experience with democracy) decreases the probability of exit from 
democracy and increases the exit rate from autocracy.  
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Section G: The Role of Culture 
More recent literature on the quality and presence of specific institutions (rule of law, 
property rights, etc) revolves around culture. Culture is defined as the set of morals and beliefs 
people use to govern their actions in the social sphere. Since the release of the Acemoglu et al 
(2001) research on settler mortality, there has been hunt to determine what results in the 
persistence of past institutions into modern times. Some contend that factor endowments or 
ethnic fractionalization play a strong role in allowing the persistence of past institutions. 
Tabellini (2008a) contends that culture, more specifically, the conception of morality within a 
group of people, acts as the link between past and present institutions. Tabellini divides morality 
in two specific categories, generalized morality and limited morality. Generalized morality is 
defined to mean to that an individual will “value a general application of norms of good conduct 
in a society of abstract individuals entitled to specific rights.” Nations with a culture of 
generalized morality have stronger institutions because the people are more likely to be law-
abiding, politicians are less corrupt and because voters want high quality politician interested in 
social welfare. Limited morality is found when specific codes of honor are followed only within 
a small group of people and there is no widespread value for the rights of an individual. Tabellini 
finds that “trust and respect” as measured by the World Values Survey is highly, positively 
related to quality political institutions. Because of the possible reverse causality between Trust 
and the quality of political institutions, Tabellini uses a linguistic variable to instrument for 
Trust. Specifically, he uses pronoun drop and the Tu/Vous distinction found in some languages 
to instrument for the cultural value of trust/respect and remove the possibility of endogeneity 
from the model. The explanations for the linguistic variables are found Section II of this study. 
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It has long been contended that culture matters greatly in the development of markets and 
is used in some models as a factor in the economic viability of later generations. Tabellini 
(2008b) studies a model in which cultural values are transmitted from parents to children. 
Parents determine which values they wish to transmit based on the conditions (economic, 
political, etc.) of the environment and by determining which set of cultural values would be 
useful in the future. In Tabellini’s model, historical institutions that result in weak political forces 
and weak enforcement systems force the mass of people to look at informal avenues to guide 
their decision making.  In a classic argument for the role of culture in democracy, Putnam (1994) 
analyzes why some nations are able to implement democracy effectively while others fail. 
Putnam looks into how certain cultural values such as civic engagement, political equality, trust, 
tolerance and structures available for cooperation play a role in developing the “civic 
community.” A stronger civic community correlates strongly with institutional performance for 
various states in Italy. He also argued that religion plays a role in developing a civic culture. The 
relationship between government institutions and culture has been more formally developed 
using two stage least square regression (2LS) models. Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz (2007) 
use 2LS models to determine the relationship between government norms such as rule of law, 
corruption and democratic accountability. Licht et al find that culture has a significant effect on 
these government norms. To combat the possibility of endogeneity in the regression analysis, 
Licht et al use the “pronoun drop” linguistic measure as an instrument for individualism.  
Apolte (2012) contends that income inequality is not necessary for revolution. Acemoglu 
and Robinson state that the gains of the individual after a revolution are the same as the gains by 
a group. Apolte disagrees and brings in a more complicated angle to the political economy of 
revolution. He argues that collective action is the key to revolution and that the mechanisms to 
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overcome the issues surrounding collective action are more important to the potential for 
revolution than is income inequality. Apolte introduces a model in which he adds in a deeper, 
mathematical model for the collective action problem within the scheme of a revolution. He 
states that revolution is normally carried out by a poor crowd within a nation; however, the 
activities of the revolution are planned by the elite of the poor. The poor elite is kept small to 
minimize free riding and increase efficient decision making. Apolte makes the conclusion that, 
ultimately, revolutions occur if there is sufficient revolutionary potential. That potential is 
realized only if a sufficient number of poor revolutionaries commits to a single collective action; 
this commitment depends on the social commitments and culture within a nation of different 
groups of people.  
Section II: Concluding Remarks 
 Our analysis is focused on determining the level of democracy after a point of political 
disequilibrium. The literature mainly focuses on democracy levels at equilibrium, but the 
variables studied in the literature may play a role in the transitional level of democracy. Using 
the literature as a guide, specific determinants of equilibrium democracy will be studied. 
Economic development, institutional quality, natural resource abundance and income inequality 
may affect the strength of democratic institutions after political equilibrium and will be included 
in our analysis.  
Culture may play an interesting role in nations after revolutions. As was seen in 
Tabellini’s model (2008b), people tend to fall back on their cultural values to guide decisions 
when formal institutions are weak. Culture can play the role of informal institutions, and as was 
seen in the study by Licht et al (2007), can affect formal, government norms. In the years 
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following a revolution, formal institutions are broken down, and theoretically, informal 
institutions begin to guide the decisions of people. The level of democracy may be highly 
affected by the cultural values of the mass after a revolution. However, to study a causal link 
between culture and the level of democracy after a revolution, strong empirical and theoretical 
foundations are necessary.  
Hofstede and Schwartz develop measures for other dimensions of culture. These will be 
discussed in the data section. Revolution represents a point in the history of a nation in which 
sudden change is taking place. The nations of Arab Spring are attempting to rid themselves of 
despotic regimes. The hope is that democratic institutions will be developed and fostered in these 
Arab nations after revolution. Democracy is valued as a way for the individual to voice his/her 
concerns in the public square. However, after a revolution, the level of democracy may not 
reflect the initial revolutionary endeavors of the public. It is possible that the democracy realized 
by these revolutions could dissolve into more tyrannical forms of government. To determine the 
level of democracy after a revolution, various factors outlined in this section must be studied. 
Using strong instruments for possibly endogenous explanatory variables will allow a strong 
empirical backing to our determination of the effect of various factors on the level of democracy 
after a revolution.  
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Section III. Definition of Data  
Section A: Dependent Variable 
 Polity IV: The Polity IV dataset contains an index of democracy ranging from values of -
10 to 10 including three special values. The special index values are -66, -77 and -88. The polity 
data set looks into the qualities of democracy and identifying nations that have strong 
democracies (10 on the index) or autocratic regimes (-10 in the index is a hereditary monarchy). 
The index is constructed from studies based on executive recruitment, constraints of executive 
authority and political competition. Nations with high constraints on the executive and high 
levels of political competition are considered to be stronger democracies. The studies that 
constructed this data set also categorize the data into three groups based on the index. Nations 
with an index from -10 to -6 are considered to be autocracies while nations from -5 to +5 are 
considered anocracies. The special values, -66, -77 and -88, are considered to be anocracies as 
well. Index values from +6 to +10 are considered to be democracies.  
 For our study, we are concerned with the special values coded for in the Polity IV index. 
Anocracies are considered to be in between autocracies and democracies. In these nations, power 
is in the hands of the elite of the nation, but the elite are not consolidated like in an oligarchy. 
Warlords or other elite groups compete for power. Each value, however, has its own specific 
definition based on the type of political disequilibrium taking place. A value of -66 represents a 
point of foreign intervention in which another nation enters and replaces the existing 
government. This was the situation in Kuwait in 1990. Both -77 and -88 involve disequilibria 
precipitated by internal strife in a nation. The -77 code is a point of interregnum. Interregnum 
involves the presence of a decentralized government in which informal rulers have control of 
various regions within a nation. This was found to occur in Lebanon from 1975 to 2005. A -88 
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code represents what can be considered a true revolution. During these years, the nation is in a 
full transition as a result of civil unrest. The Iranian movement in 1953 represents a transition 
period. The level of democracy after these transitions was measured by taking the 5 year average 
of the Polity IV index after a transition period.  
Section B: Explanatory Variables 
 In this section, the major explanatory variables will be described briefly based on the 
reviewed literature. Also, a brief overview of the theory and construction of possible instruments 
for cultural values will be discussed. 
Cultural Variables 
 Defining culture is as troublesome as measuring it numerically. Culture is defined as a set 
of values, morals, symbols and guidelines that direct a person’s actions. Culture also consists of 
the complex interaction of all of these factors that provide the underpinning for various norms 
within a society (Markus and Kitayama 1994). Attempts have been made to break down culture 
into a set of specific values that can be measured using surveys. This analysis will focus on 
individualism as a cultural value because strong instruments exist that can control of reverse 
causality. The issue of reverse causality will be addressed later on. Three major measures of 
individualism have been constructed by different groups. 
Measuring Individualism 
World Values Survey (WVS) Measure: Ronald Inglehart and his colleagues (2000) 
carried out a project to document the cultural values of people across the world. The project 
started in 1981 and covered more than 90 countries. To measure individual responsibility, each 
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respondent was asked to rate their feelings about individual responsibility on a ten-point scale in 
which an answer of one represents that, “People should take more responsibility to provide for 
themselves,” while ten meant the respondent had the belief that “The government should take 
more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for.” These values were reversed so that 
larger values corresponded to a higher level of individualism. The WVS also measured a level of 
“Respect” for people across cultures. The survey asked “Here is a list of qualities that children 
can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? 
Please choose up to five” (choose out of good manners; independence; obedience; hard work; 
feeling of responsibility; imagination; thrift, saving money and things; determination and 
perseverance; religious faith; unselfishness, tolerance and respect for others”). Respect is defined 
as the percent of respondents indicating that tolerance and respect for others is an important 
quality to teach. 
 Hofstede and Schwartz Measures of Individualism: Hofstede (2001) and Schwartz (2006) 
develop separate measures of individualism based on separate surveys. Hofstede measures 4 
different dimensions of culture based on surveys of IBM employees in 70 different nations. 
Hofstede creates a measure of individualism, power/distance (social inequality), masculinity and 
uncertainty/avoidance. Schwartz develops measures for individualism/collectivism, 
harmony/mastery (attitudes toward the environment) and hierarchy/egalitarianism (class 
structure) based on surveys of school teachers and college students from across 70 nations. The 
Schwartz and Hofstede databases have been used extensively in previous economic analysis; 
however, neither provides as broad a sample as the WVS measure of individualism.  
 Cultural values are considered to be slowly changing when compared to economic 
variables; however, it is possible that the level of democracy in a nation can affect people’s 
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attitudes. In a study by Maseland and van Hoorn (2011), the people of nations with low levels of 
democracy value democracy more than people of other nations. This reflects what Maseland and 
van Hoorn called marginal preference for democracy. From this study, it would seem that the 
level of democracy does have an effect on cultural attitudes. However, to measure the effect that 
culture has on the level of democracy after a revolution, strong instruments must be used to 
control for the possibility of reverse causality. Recent work has focused on developing 
instruments for the aforementioned individualism variables.  
Instruments for Individualism 
 A recent push in economics literature has been to find strong instruments for cultural 
values. Instruments have been developed for the individualism variables (WVS, Hofstede, 
Schwartz); however, new data must be analyzed to find instruments for the other cultural 
dimension variables. Because this analysis focuses on the effect of individualism on the level of 
democracy after a transition, I will delve into the instruments that have been used for this 
dimension of culture.  
Linguistic Instruments 
Pronoun Drop: Kashima and Kashima (1998) first analyzed the presence of pronoun drop in 
different languages throughout the world. Pronoun drop is based on a speaker’s ability to drop 
the pronoun when referring to an action. For example, in English, it is necessary for the speaker 
say “I write.” Without the pronoun, the sentence is ambiguous. In Spanish, one would say 
“Escribo,” or “Yo escribo.” Both signal to the listener that the speaker is referring to self. In 
Japanese, however, one may say “ 知らない。気に入った,” which phonetically translates to 
Shiranai. Ki ni itta?” This translates into “I don’t know. Do you like it?” However, the 
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pronouns, highlighted in bold, are not stated in the phonetic translation, they are inferred. Using 
pronoun drop as an instrument for cultural values is based on the Linguistic Relativity 
Hypothesis or the Sapir-Whorf theory. The original theory is broken down into two basic 
precepts. Variation in language systems result in cognitive differences between speakers of each 
respective language. Also, the actual construction of a language, as stated by Brown (1954) 
“strongly influences or fully determines the world-view he will acquire as he/she learns the 
language (Kay and Kempton 2009).” Essentially, the native language of an individual acts as the 
constraint on a person’s world view and cultural values. We can make use of this theory and use 
pronoun drop as an instrument for cultural values. 
Genetic Markers: Blood types are considered to be neutral genetic markers that are a result of 
alleles that do not affect the psychological profile of a person. Gordonichenko and Roland (2011) 
take advantage of variations in the frequency of blood type alleles to instrument for the cultural 
value of individualism. Gordonichenko and Roland base this instrument on the correlation 
between cultural values and genetic inheritance. They theorize that parents transmit selective 
cultural values just as alleles are passed down through generations. Cultural values change 
slowly in the context of economic time; however, genetic differences are even slower to change. 
Using this instrument, Gordonichenko and Roland find that individualism has a causal effect on 
economic growth when controlling for other factors such as institutional quality. They find that 
nations that are less genetically distant from the US have more individualistic cultures. 
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) also state that alleles are passed down from parents to 
children, similar to the weigh cultural values are transmitted.. They find that genetic distance 
between populations is positively correlated with income per capita even when controlling for 
other factors such as geographic differences. Culture, however, is not directly studied in this 
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paper. Instead, they use genetic distance from the US or UK as a measure of barriers to diffusion. 
These genetic differences could also play a role as an instrument for cultural values. 
Gordonichenko and Roland (2011) use the genetic variable from Spolaore and Wacziarg to test 
the robustness of their genetic instrument.  
Average Covariance of Rainfall: Davis (2012) develops another interesting instrument for 
individualism based on a risk sharing model. Davis uses rainfall variation as a measure of 
agricultural risk. Rainfall data is available for many countries and extends back to 1697. The 
model of risk sharing makes a connection between the average rainfall variation within a nation 
and cultural values of individualism/collectivism. Davis finds a strong effect of rainfall variation 
on the WVS measure of individualism. Individualism, after it is instrumented for using rainfall 
variation data, has a strong positive effect on economic development.  
Multiple instruments have been developed to combat the presence of reverse causality 
between the level of democracy after a revolution and the cultural dimension of individualism. 
We can make use of these instruments in our analysis together and test the robustness of each.  
Characteristics of the Revolution and Time Sensitivity 
Using the Polity IV dataset, variables can be constructed that capture general 
characteristics of all revolutions. The length of the revolution and the 5 year average of the level 
of democracy before the revolution are used as explanatory variables. A dummy variable was 
created to mark whether the transition was a foreign intervention, anarchy or a transition.  It is 
thought that the characteristics of a political disequilibrium caused by outside forces are different 
than those of an internal nature. Along with nations that are undergoing a transition due to 
political strife, the new states created as a result of colonization or other factors are included in 
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the dataset. These nations are normally transitioning from rule by another country into sovereign 
states of their own. For example, Turkmenistan was formed as a result of the breakup of the 
Soviet Union in 1991. A form of government had to be determined by those that fell within the 
national lines of Turkmenistan. This is a narrative that is familiar to nations that are formed as a 
result of the decolonization of African nations in post-World War III era such as Ghana. A 
dummy variable is generated to separate new states and other forms of transition. Furthermore, 
the “5 Year Pre-Transition Polity” for each of these new nations was assigned a value of “-2.” 
These nations were formed as a result of the removal of the extended leadership put in place by 
the central authority. This value was selected so as to keep the “New State” dummy insignificant 
as it appeared in model prior to the assignment of a -2 value for the “5 Year Pre-Transition 
Polity” variable.  
 In an attempt to capture “democracy spillovers,” the number of countries with a 
democracy (polity2 score > 0) in any year was included as a regressor. Other nations going 
through transition may be more likely to form a stable democracy as more democratic nations 
exist throughout the world. Between 1800 and present day, different waves of democratization 
also took place.  The first wave of democratization occurred in retaliation of colonization, mainly 
in Latin America (Extended 19th Century). The next wave occurred in the period prior to World 
War II (Interwar Period). Another shock to democratization occurred before the cold war as a 
result of Soviet breakdown (Pre-Cold War Era), while the last shock is in the current era of 
democratization.   
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Section C: Control Variables 
 Economic Development- Income, Urbanization and Primary Enrollment Rate: Using the 
expanded Maddison database, the income per capita for each nation in this analysis was 
determined. This database provides income data for nations back to 1820 and is ideal for 
analyzing revolutions. The Maddison database was also used by Benhabib et al (2011) in their 
updated analysis regarding the relationship between income and democracy. However, because 
the income per capita data contains many missing variables, a linear adjustment was carried out 
to fill in missing values. A best fit line was generated based on the available income per capita 
data for each nation and the missing years were filled in. The 5 year average of the income per 
capita prior to the revolution was used as a possible control. Income per capita, however, may be 
difficult to utilize in the analysis because it is endogenous with respect to democracy levels.    
 Benavot and Riddle (1988) expanded the current data available on primary enrollment 
rates for over 125 nations. The advantage of this dataset is that they estimate primary enrollment 
between 1870 and 1940. Their data consists of enrollment rates in each data between that time 
period. This dataset covers much of the early portions of the PolityIV dataset utilized in this 
analysis. To cover each year between each decade, a linear extrapolation of the data was carried 
out. A best fit line was generated based on the decade-based primary enrollment rates, and the 
specific years between the decades were filled in. The enrollment rate after 1940 was obtained 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.   
 Colonization Variables: The distance of each nation from the equator is also included in 
this analysis as a proxy for institutional quality. Hall and Jones (1999) use the distance from the 
equator as an instrument for institutional quality. The log of the arable land suitable for wheat to 
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the land suitable for sugar harvest ratio is included in our models as a control. Easterly (2007) 
used this geographic measure as an instrument for income inequality. The Gini coefficient is 
normally used as a measure for income inequality; however, it is also an endogenous regressor. 
The log of the wheat to sugar ratio is exogenous and acts as a strong proxy for income inequality. 
La Porta et al (2008) look into the role that legal origin plays on creditors rights’ in the present. 
Legal origin is related to the legal system of the colonizing nation. For example, the United 
States was originally a colony of Great Britain. The US ultimately adopted a British style legal 
system. Only the French legal origin was included in our analysis because there are a limited 
number of observations. Four regional dummy variables were created to control for cross-
regional effects. Dummies for East and South Asia, Europe and Central Asia, Middle East and 
Africa and the Western Hemisphere were constructed.  
 Ethnic Fractionalization: Ethnic fractionalization is also included in our analysis. Alesina 
et al (2003) find that ethnic fractionalization is more important than religion in affecting the 
quality of policies and institutions. However, they also found strong correlation between ethnic 
fractionalization and other explanatory variables (specifically geographic variables). Ethnic 
fractionalization is measured by differentiating between linguistic, ethnic and religious 
fractionalization. Ethnicity was determined based on a combination of linguistic and racial 
characteristics.   
 Natural Resources: Natural resources were divided into oil exports and other natural 
resource exports. Using Easterly’s Social Indicators Fixed Factors Database. A dummy variable 
is created for nations in which more than 50% of all exports are natural resources. There is a 
substantial amount of measurement error in these variables because no date is marked as to when 
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oil or other natural resources were discovered/mined in each country. Oil exporters are marked 
only after 1900.  
 Muslim Share in 1900: Using the dataset developed by Barro and McCleary (2003), I add 
the Muslim share of the population in 1900 as a regressor. This measure acts as a proxy for the 
current share of the Muslim population in any country.  
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Section IV. Results of Regression Analysis                   
 The results are broken down into 6 major sections. Initially, I will present the descriptive 
statistics of the variables used in the analysis. In section B, the structural characteristics of each 
transition will be taken into account to create a general model of post transitional democracy 
levels. I test the effect of cultural dimensions on post-transitional democracy levels in Section B 
using this model of political transitions.   In section C, I test if culture affects the post-transitional 
level of democracy by including in the model from section B. I can then continue to test the 
robustness of the cultural dimension measures using other factors.   
 In Section D, I test the robustness of the cultural dimension variables against economic 
development, colonization history, natural resources, among other factors that may affect the 
post-transition level of democracy. These factors are derived from other studies outlined in the 
literature review. Section D1 is dedicated to testing the robustness of cultural dimension 
variables against economic development and colonization variables. In section D2, natural 
resource variables, ethnic fractionalization and the Muslim population share are included as 
controls in the model of post-transitional democracy. In Section D3, a composite model 
including multiple controls is generated. In this model, I test if the cultural dimension measures 
affect post-transitional democracy when included with controls for various factors.  
 Section E contains the IV regressions using our three different instruments for each 
measure of individualism. Instrumental variable analysis aids in determining if there is a causal 
link between post-transitional levels of democracy and culture. In Section F, the post-transitional 
level of democracy within various Arab Spring nations will be predicted using multiple models 
to get a sense of where the Arab Spring nations are heading with their political institutions.  
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Section A: Descriptive Statistics 
 Using the Polity IV dataset and other dataset, a general model of political transitions can 
be generated. The variables used in the analysis of post-transitional democracy are shown in 
table A of the appendix. The average post-transitional level of democracy is at -0.7 while the 
standard deviation is large. In this table, we should particularly focus on the cultural dimension 
variables. The Hofstede individualism measure has a mean of 39. This signifies that, on average, 
most nations are collectivist. The lowest level of individualism in this dataset is Guatemala while 
the largest level of individualism is for Australia. Similarly, for the power-distance measure, the 
lowest power-distance measure is from Austria while the highest is in Malaysia. The other major 
cultural value used in this analysis is the WVS measure of individual responsibility. The mean of 
individualism based on the WVS measure is 5.14. Austria is the nation with the highest 
individualism measure while Macedonia registers with the lowest. The descriptive statistics for 
the other control variables and the instruments are shown in table A.  
Section B: Characteristics of the Revolution 
 All political disequilibria contain some common characteristics. Before testing the effect 
of culture of the post-transitional level of democracy, different characteristics of each transition 
are tested to develop a model of political transition.  
 In Table 1 of the appendix, the different structural features of each transition are taken 
into account. Democratization has been broken down into 4 major waves over time as described 
in the literature review. Dummy variables are used to mark new states and transitions that occur 
within each of the periods outlined. These dummy variables are in reference to the omitted 
present day dummy which covers from 1989 to the present. These variables mark specific 
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plateaus of democratization through time. In each of the models, the time periods are all 
significant predictors of post-transitional democracy. This is interesting considering the recent 
trend of democratization is based on the breakup of the former Soviet Union. It is possible that 
these more recent democratic transitions have not yet reached an equilibrium level of democracy. 
 Over time, the total number of nations that have adopted more democratic styles of 
government has increased. This may be due to the effect of democratic spillovers. The “Total 
Democratic Nation in that Year” captures the effect of democratic spillover in any single year. 
This regressor is significant at the 1% level in each model. If the number of democracies 
increases by one from a single year to the next, the post-transitional level of democracy in that 
year increases by approximately 0.16 units in column (1) of table 1 .  
  The New State dummy is not significant in any of the regression models except column 
(5) of table 1. It is omitted in column (6) because no length of transition can be given to nations 
that are just formed. Different types of transitions were also accounted for. Political disequilibria 
were differentiated by dummy variables depending on if the disequilibrium was a foreign 
intervention, a state of anarachy or a political transition (people’s revolution/free elections). Only 
“anarchy” was significant at the 10% level in column (4).  
Furthermore, a variable was included for nations that experienced some sort of 
disequilibrium within the past 10 years of the current transition. This is a measure of stability of 
democracy. This can measure whether the leaders of the new transition were able to increase the 
level of democracy after learning from the past. This variable is negative but insignificant in 
column (1).  
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 Within this analysis, the “5 year Pre-Transition Polity” is included. This variable is used 
to measure a nation’s previous experience with democracy. This regressor attempts to capture the 
“democratic capital” of a nation, as coined by Perrson and Tabellini. The previous level of 
democracy prior to transition does not seem to affect the post-transitional level of democracy. 
This would support that these political disequilibria are causing some legitimate change in the 
political institutions.  
Lastly, regional dummies are included in the analysis. Regions are separated mainly by 
geographic location. The East/South Asia region has significantly higher post-transitional levels 
of democracy than other regions. A transition in that geographic region seems to have a 3 point 
increase in post-transitional levels of democracy. Furthermore, transitions in Europe/Central Asia 
also tend to have a 2 point head start in post-transitional levels of democracy. The omitted group 
is the Middle East/Africa.  The final model includes the time period dummies, the democracy 
spillover variable, the new state dummy, regional variables and the previous level of democracy.  
Section C1: Cultural Dimension Variables and Transitions 
 In this section, I test the central hypothesis that cultural values play a role in determining 
the post-transitional level of democracy. Two dimensions of culture were used in this analysis 
because they may have an effect on people’s individual view of government and social 
hierarchy. According to Tabellini (2008a), egalitarianism plays an important role in affecting the 
formal institutions that develop in nations. Furthermore, work by Licht et al (2007) supports that 
individualism strongly affects the development of political institutions. Based on these works, it 
would be prudent to test whether these two dimensions affect the post-transitional level of 
democracy. The individualism measure by Hofstede, Schwartz and the World Values Survey is 
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used along with a measure of egalitarianism. Egalitarianism is measured by the Hofstede Power-
Distance variable, the WVS Respect and the Schwartz Hierarchy variable. While other cultural 
dimension measures are available, these two are the major focus of this analysis because of their 
role in affecting political institutions and decision making.  
 In table 2 of the appendix, the effect of individualism and egalitarianism on the post-
transition level of democracy are seen. Columns (1) to (3) measure the effect of individualism. 
The Hofstede measure of individualism is significant at the 1% level and positively affects post-
transitional levels of democracy. A one standard deviation (20.4) increase in the Hofstede 
measure of individualism results in a 2.0 point increase in the post transition level of democracy. 
For example, a transition in Egypt (Hofstede Individualism = 25) should result in a lower level of 
democracy after a revolution (1.26) as compared to a transition in Saudi Arabia (Hofstede 
Individualism = 38) with all else held constant. The WVS measure of individualism also 
positively and significantly affects the post-transitional level of democracy. A single standard 
deviation (0.85) increase in this measure of individual responsibility results in a 1.56 point 
increase in the dependent variable. If we look again at the example of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, 
we find different outcomes. A transition in Saudi Arabia, according to this measure (WVS 
Individual Responsibility = 5.769) would have a higher level of democracy (3.65 units) than a 
transition in Egypt (WVS Individual Responsibility = 3.78) holding all other factors constant. 
The Schwartz measure of collectivism is significant at the 1% level and negative. This is 
expected because collectivist attitudes are the opposite of individualistic attitudes. A single 
standard deviation (0.35) increase in this measure of individualism, results in a decrease in 
democracy by 2.6 units after a transition. A transition in Israel (Schwartz Embededness = 3.823) 
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is expected to have a higher level of democracy after the transition (1.5 units higher) than a 
Turkish transition (Schwartz Embededness = 4.026). 
 In columns (4) to (6) of table 2, the effect of egalitarianism is measured. The Hofstede 
power-distance variable is negative and significant at the 1% level. An increase in the power 
distance measure by one standard deviation (18.8) results in a 1.9 point decrease in the post 
transition level of democracy. However, the “Respect” dimension studied in the WVS is not 
significant. The correlation between these value and the other social hierarchy tolerance 
variables is negative. This would support the idea that the Respect dimension is capturing the 
cultural value of egalitarianism. The Schwartz measure of egalitarianism is negative and 
significant at the 1% level. It is negative because it captures tolerance for social hierarchy, 
similar the power-distance measure. A single standard deviation (0.49) increase in the Hierarchy 
variable results in a 3 unit decrease in the level of democracy after a transition.  
The theory of various waves of democratization seems to hold when analyzing their 
effect on post-transitional levels of democracy. Among the controls, the democratic spillover 
variable is also significant at the 1% level in all the models. When controlling for culture, the 
effect of having more democratic nations in the years after transition increases the post-
transitional level of democracy by approximately 0.18 to 0.2 units. The New State dummy is also 
significant and positive in all the models. The effect of being a New State is accentuated in 
columns (3) and (6) because of the limited number of new states found in the dataset when the 
Schwartz measures are included. New states tend to start with 2 units more of post-transitional 
level of democracy. The level of democracy before transition is not significant in any model. 
This variable may have been acting as a proxy for cultural values.  
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The WVS measure of individualism is significant and positive at the 1% level and 
includes the largest number of observations of transitions. Interestingly, each measure of 
individualism delivers a similar economic significance on the post-transition level of democracy. 
Both the Hofstede measure of individualism and the WVS measure point to a similar increase in 
the level of post-transition democracy. An increase in individualism seems to have anywhere 
from a 1.5 to 2 point increase on the post transition level of democracy. Similarly, the 
egalitarianism measures also affect the post-transitional level of democracy in similar fashions. 
This supports that the measures are picking up similar cultural constructs of individualism and 
egalitarianism.  
 Individualism and egalitarianism do have an effect on the transitions of these nations into 
democracy. The R2 value rises dramatically from our initial models (~0.13 to ~0.23) as a result 
of including our cultural dimension variables. In the case of the Schwartz variables, the 
explanatory power of the cultural dimensions increases dramatically to 0.349 (column (3)). 
However, because no other variables are included in the analysis it is possible that there is a bias 
in our results. Our results strongly support that the assertion that culture matters for the post-
transitional level of democracy. 
Section D: Robustness of Cultural Dimension Variables 
 Other factors have been theorized to affect the equilibrium level of democracy in any 
nation. The robustness of our cultural dimension variables in predicting the post-transition level 
of democracy will be done in three separate sections. In Section C1, the effects of economic 
development and factors such as institutional quality, inequality and colonization on post-
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transitional democracy are studied. In Section C2, post-transitional democracy is further 
analyzed using natural resource data.  
Section D1: Economic Development, Colonization History, Cultural Dimensions and 
Political Transitions 
 Economic development is theorized to affect the equilibrium level of democracy based on 
research by Lipset (1959) and Benhabib et al (2011). The linear extrapolations of income per 
capita and primary enrollment rates are included in the analysis of post-revolutionary democracy. 
Table 3 of the appendix outlines the change in the individualism variables after the 
inclusion of our economic development measures. When included with the linear income per 
capita, columns (1), (4) and (7) show that the effect of individualism is cut and less accurately 
specified. However, individualism is still significantly important in determining the post-
transitional level of democracy. The WVS measure is particularly robust in column (4). The 
linear income per capita is significant in models (4) and (6) at the 1% level. The explanatory 
power each model does not increase greatly by the inclusion of the income per capita. The effect 
of including the linear primary enrollment rate is seen in columns (2), (5) and (8) of Table 3. The 
primary enrollment rate data limits the available observations to 120, 142 and 79 for the 
Hofstede, WVS and Schwartz measures respectively. The Hofstede individualism measure and 
the WVS measure are robust after primary enrollment rates are added at the 10 and 5% levels 
respectively. The Schwartz embededness measure is significant to the inclusion of primary 
enrollment rate at the 1% level. However, only 79 observations are used in this analysis.  
Other studies have shown that culture and income per capita are highly related to one 
another. Davis (2012) establishes the positive relationship between income levels and 
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individualism using the WVS individual responsibility measure. Economic development is also 
thought to cause a breakdown of informal institutions which support more collectivist attitudes 
based on kin relationships. Davis (2006) develops a model in which he demonstrates the 
breakdown of informal institutions as a result of economic development. Individualistic attitudes 
would increase with more economic development. However, his model does not address how 
cultural attitudes can shape economic development. Gordonichenko and Roland (2011), find 
culture to be significantly related to productivity levels. They develop a model in which 
countries with higher levels of individualism have stronger incentives to innovate because of 
social rewards. Higher levels of innovation result in higher levels of economic growth and 
income per capita.  
Culturally guided economic decisions are one way in which culture can affect post-
transitional democracy levels. Culture affects income per capita which then affects the 
democracy level after a political disequilibrium. This explanation is also true for primary 
enrollment rate (which seems to be the more important economic development measure in this 
study). If individualism and income per capita are positively correlated, then the coefficient on 
individualism should fall as the explanatory power of culture drops. By using IV estimation, we 
can determine if culture directly affects the post-transitional level of democracy or only affects it 
through the channel of economic development.  
Proxies for colonization history are also included in our analysis of the post-transitional 
level of democracy. Columns (3), (6) and (9) include proxies for institutional quality (distance 
from the equator and legal origin) and income inequality (wheat to sugar ratio). All measures of 
individualism are highly robust to the inclusion of each of the exogenous measures. The 
Hofstede individualism measure has a larger coefficient when these proxies are included in the 
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analysis.  The legal French origin is significant in column (3) at the 10% level, but not in any 
other model. The distance from the equator is significant and positive in all the included models. 
The wheat to sugar ratio is significant in all the included models, however, the sign is opposite of 
what is expected. It has been theorized by Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) that higher levels of 
income inequality can distort gains from democracy. The negative coefficients on the wheat to 
sugar ratio variable suggest that nations with higher levels of income inequality (lower wheat to 
sugar ratios) tend to have higher levels of post-transitional levels of democracy. This fits in well 
with the model proposed by Acemoglu and Robinson (2001). Those in lower classes revolt 
against the ruling elite when there can be a gain from revolution. Revolution will occur if the 
disparity in income between the elite and poor reaches some critical limit. When there are higher 
levels of income inequality, there is more to gain from revolution. It is important to keep in mind 
that we are studying the effect of culture during the post-transitional period, not at the 
equilibrium level. Higher levels of income inequality are theorized to destabilize the equilibrium 
level of democracy. In this model, I find that indeed income inequality (as a result of agricultural 
differences) plays a large role in affecting the development of democracy in nations. 
Furthermore, the negative relationship between individualism and the wheat to sugar ratio 
suggests that not including the wheat to sugar ratio biases the results of the OLS coefficients 
down.  
The same analysis is repeated in Table 4 of the appendix except in this table, the 
egalitarianism measures are tested. The addition of the economic development variables reduces 
the effect of egalitarianism. Furthermore, the WVS measure for egalitarianism is not robust to 
the inclusion of economic development measures. Income per capita and primary enrollment rate 
are both significant and positively affect the post-transitional level of democracy. Each measure 
38	  
 
of egalitarianism is significant to the inclusion of our colonization proxies. The magnitude of the 
coefficient on the Hofstede power-distance measure and WVS respect measure increase after 
controlling for the exogenous colonization proxies. Again, the wheat to sugar ratio has a 
significant and negative effect on the post-transitional level of democracy.  
The time period controls are still significant in our models. Surprisingly, the effects of 
democratic spillover are still highly significant and positive. The previous level of democracy is 
still not an important predictor of post-transition level of democracy. Lastly, the New State 
dummy is significant in some models, but not in others. In those models where it is a significant 
regressor, it has a positive sign. Those nations that are formed as a result of de-colonization or 
civil war tend to have higher levels of post-transitional levels of democracy. In these models, 
there is an increase in the amount of variability in post-transitional democracy levels that is 
explained. The R2 value in each of these models is larger than when culture is included as the 
lone regressor. In the models including the colonization proxies, the R2 increases dramatically to 
approximately 0.36. A stronger portion of post-transitional democracy can be explained using 
each of these measures.  
From these models, we find that culture is still robust to the inclusion of institutional 
quality, income inequality and legal French origin. Income inequality and institutional quality 
may also play a significant role in predicting the post-transitional level of democracy. We also 
find that our economic development regressors are important in determining the post-transitional 
level of democracy. Culture may play a role in affecting the economic development of a nation 
while not affecting the post-transitional level of democracy directly.  
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Section D2: Natural Resource, Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization, Islam, Culture and 
Transitions 
 Natural resources have also been thought to affect the equilibrium level of democracy 
because high levels of natural resources generate political rents and support corruption in the 
political sphere. Ethnic fractionalization is another important measure of social differences 
within a single nation. Higher levels of ethnic fractionalization are thought to result in more 
disjointed political systems and weaker institutions. Another important aspect of democracy, 
especially in the context of the Arab Spring, is the Muslim share of the population.  Barro (1999) 
finds that most Muslim nations are not normally democratic.  
 Table 5 in the appendix shows the robustness of our individualism measures to the 
inclusion of natural resource exports, ethnic fractionalization and the Muslim share of the 
population in 1900. In columns (1), (4) and (7) we find that individualism significantly affects 
the post-transitional level of democracy after inclusion of the natural resource exporters dummy. 
In each of the models, the sign on the natural resource exporters dummy is negative, and 
significant except in column (7). In columns (2), (5) and (8), we find individualism is robust to 
the inclusion of ethnic fractionalization. The ethnic fractionalization measure is negative, but not 
a significant regressor in the models. In prior research, Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) 
find that nations with higher levels of ethnic fractionalization tend to have a less favorable view 
of government redistribution. The results of their study may have actually been omitting the role 
that culture plays in developing a view of government institutions and programs.  The role of the 
Muslim share in 1900 is shown in columns (3), (6) and (9). Each of the individualism measures 
is significant to the inclusion of the Muslim Share of the population in 1900. This share is used 
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as a measure of religion affiliation because it can act as an exogenous proxy for current religious 
shares.  
 In Table 6, I repeat the analysis using our cultural measures for egalitarianism. From the 
table, we observe similar results after the inclusion of natural resource exporters and ethnic 
fractionalization. The egalitarianism measures are significant to the inclusion of the natural 
resource exporters dummy, ethnic fractionalization and the Muslim Share of the population. In 
each of these models, the WVS Respect measure is not significant or marginally significant. The 
results from this variable do not give the same results as the other two measures of 
egalitarianism.  
 We find similar results in our controls when controlling for natural resource exporters, 
ethnic fractionalization and the Muslim Share in 1900 as we did with economic development and 
colonization history. The time periods are significant in this analysis while the democratic 
spillover variable is still a highly significant predictor of post-transitional levels of democracy. 
New state dummies still show about a 2 point increase for nations forming as a result of de-
colonization.  
Section D3: A Composite Model of Culture and Transitions 
 A total model of political transitions including economic development, colonization 
proxies, natural resources and culture is generated to paint a better picture of political 
disequilibrium events. In this model, the income per capita, distance from the equator, 
wheat:sugar ratio, natural resources and Muslim share variables are used to develop a more 
holistic model of transitions. Income per capita is used in this analysis instead of primary 
enrollment because income per capita contains about 40 more observations than primary 
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enrollment. Furthermore, economic development measures tend to move together over time as 
they are all related to one another.  
 Table 7 depicts the results from the composite model of political transition. In each of the 
models outlined, culture tends be a strong predictor of the post transitional level of democracy 
except in column (5) where the WVS Respect measure is not significant. In each model, the 
effect of culture is cut by the inclusion of the control variables. Furthermore, income per capita is 
strongly positive in this model. We have yet to answer the question regarding the effect of 
culture on income per capita. It is possible that culture is affecting income per capita, which then 
affects economic development and the development of democracy. Distance from the equator is 
no longer significant or marginally significant in each of the models shown while the wheat to 
sugar ratio is highly significant and negative in each model. This, again, supports the model of 
political transition proposed by Acemoglu and Robinson (2001).  
 Interestingly, neither the Muslim Share in 1900 nor natural resource exporter dummy 
affects the post transitional level of democracy. Religions are institutions that consist of both 
formal and informal constructions for society. Islamic societies tend to be more collectivist; 
however, along with the cultural attitude of collectivism come formal actions within Islam that 
support the development of a more collectivist society. For example, it is believed, in Islam, that 
when people pray together in groups, more blessing is attained. This develops a more connected 
society that may be collectivist in attitude. Formal and informal institutions come from religions. 
It is difficult to determine which part of culture is affecting post-transitional levels of democracy 
because religion encompasses so many aspects of life for people. By using cultural measures, we 
may be picking the portion of Islam that emphasizes collectivism. In each model, the democratic 
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spillover measure is strongly positive and significant while the previous level of democracy 
plays no significant role in determining the post-transitional level of democracy.  
Section D: Conclusions 
 The results from this section suggest the culture does matter in nations after transitions. It 
has a significant effect on the post-transitional level of democracy. However, no causal link has 
been identified yet.  
The effect of economic development is still in question because culture can affect 
democracy through a direct and indirect path. Culture can affect income levels and education 
levels, while also directly affecting the decision making processes of those who plan to revolt 
against a nation and set up a democracy. However, both income per capita and primary 
enrollment rate are important in determining the post-transitional level of democracy. 
Institutional quality and income inequality also seem to affect the democracy levels after a 
transition in a significant way. Natural resource exporters also tend to have lower post-
transitional levels of democracy. The explanatory power of our models does not increase greatly 
after the inclusion of the economic development measures. The R2 increases from about 0.22 to 
0.28. The inclusion of our colonization proxies drives up the explanatory power of our models, 
but again, culture seems to be the major predictor of post-transitional levels of democracy. 
Furthermore, the R2 measure also does not increase dramatically in Table 7 with the composite 
model of transitions.  Only about 35% of the variability in post-transitional levels of democracy 
is obtained using our models.  
43	  
 
 However, there is still a possibility the culture is endogenous in these models. Using 
instruments outlined in the data section, we can determine if the exogenous effects of culture 
affect the level of democracy after a political disequilibrium.  
Section E: Instrumental Variable Estimation  
 To control for the endogeneity of culture and determine if there is a causal link between 
culture and post-transitional levels of democracy, instrumental variable estimation is used. Along 
with determining the causal link between culture and post-transitional levels of democracy, we 
also can include our endogenous economic development measure to better understand the 
channels through which culture affects post-transitional levels of democracy. In the Literature 
Review and Data sections, a set of instruments were outlined that are used in this study to 
determine if the exogenous component of culture has an effect on post-transitional levels of 
democracy.  
Tables 8, 9 and 10 outline the first stage models of the IV regressions for each 
individualism measure using only the characteristics of the transition as controls. Three 
instruments from the literature are used to predict the instrumented individualism variables. The 
F-statistic is reported in each table. The p-value for the overidentifying restrictions test is also 
included in this analysis when more than one instrument is used. This tests the validity of each 
instrument jointly, contingent on at least one instrument being a significant predictor of culture. 
The overidentifying restrictions test determines whether the instruments are acting only through 
culture or through other possible channels. 
 In Table 8, Hofstede individualism is instrumented for using the genetic distance from 
the UK, the covariance in rainfall and the Kashima pronoun drop variable. The coefficient on the 
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genetic distance instrument and pronoun drop is large in magnitude and negative. Column (4) 
outlines the effect of both the genetic distance and pronoun drop variables on the Hofstede 
individualism measure. This model includes only the significant instruments in the model. When 
the rainfall instrument is included, it is not significant (data not shown). The F-statistic is large 
and the R2 value is also large. Also, the null hypothesis of the overidentifying restrictions test 
cannot be rejected. Further analysis with the instrumented Hofstede individualism measure is 
done using column (4) as the basic IV first stage model with added controls. 
 Table 9 contains the first stage regressions for the WVS individualism measure. In 
columns (1), (2) and (3), the effect of genetic distance from the UK, the rainfall instrument and 
pronoun drop on the WVS measure of individualism are seen respectively. The genetic distance 
instrument is not significant when included with the other regressors. The rainfall instrument and 
pronoun drop are highly significant determinants of individualism; however, the R2 value is not 
very large. The F-statistic when both significant instruments are included in the regression is 
small. This measure of individualism is not as strong once instrumented for because the 
instruments do not explain a large portion of the variation in the measure. The WVS individual 
responsibility variable suffers from a weak instrument problem; however, I still use to see if the 
effect with weak instruments is similar to the effect of the instrumented Hofstede cultural 
measure.  
The Schwartz embededness measure is instrumented for in Table 10. The genetic 
distance instrument is significant at the 1% level while the pronoun drop instrument is significant 
at the 5% level. The rainfall instrument is not significant in column (2) and is dropped from the 
final first stage model in column (4). The R2 for the final model is high, but the number of 
observations using the Schwartz measure is highly limited. In all the Schwartz first stage models, 
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the previous level of democracy also stands out as a significant regressor. This, again, may be 
due to the lack of the variation in a limited set of observations.  
 For each IV model estimated the first stage F-stat and overidentifying restrictions test p-
value will be shown in the tables. The full first stage regression will not be shown. Only the 
individualism variables will be used in this analysis because no strong instruments for social 
equity cultural dimensions have been developed. Furthermore, each analysis will be carried with 
the first stage models that include two instruments (column (4) in tables 8 to 10).  
Section E1: Instrumented Cultural Dimensions and Political Transitions 
 The analysis from Section D will be repeated using our instrumented culture variables. 
For each of the models presented, the first stage F-statistic and overidentifying restrictions test p-
value will be shown. 
In Table 11, the instrumented individualism variables are tested. The effect of each 
individualism variable on post-transitional democracy is seen. In column (1), the effect of the 
instrumented Hofstede individualism variable increases compared to the effect of the 
endogenous Hofstede value in column (1) of Table 2. The coefficient on Hofstede individualism 
increases by about 80% after IV estimation. The endogenous portion of culture biased the 
estimation on the effect of culture down. In column (2), we find that the WVS individualism 
measure is a significant predictor of post-transitional democracy at the 5% level. The magnitude 
of the coefficient increases by about 50% compared to the endogenous estimation of the WVS 
individualism effect on post-transitional democracy levels; however, the variable is not as 
precisely estimated and the first stage F-statistic is low showing a lack of joint significance. 
However, we cannot reject the null of the overidentifying restrictions test. Lastly, in column (3) 
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we find similar changes in the coefficient on the Schwartz embededness. Once instrumented for, 
the effect of the Schwartz embededness variable increases two-fold. The Schwartz measure is 
significant at the 1% level. Using the Schwartz measure, however, the number of observations 
severely decreases to include less than two-thirds of the initial dataset.  
 In each model, the democratic spillover measure is still highly significant and positive. 
Furthermore, the new state dummy is significant and positive in each model. In each model, the 
R2 is similar to or increases compared to the endogenous regressions in Table 2. The exogenous 
component of culture seems to strongly affect post-transitional levels of democracy. Using the 
same robustness controls used in Section D1 and D2, I test the robustness of the instrumented 
individualism variables to the inclusion of economic development, colonization and natural 
resource controls.  
Section E2: Economic Development, Colonization History, Instrumented Cultural 
Dimensions and Political Transitions 
 In this section, we revisit the question of the paths through which culture can affect post-
transitional levels of democracy. In the initial robustness regressions, there is a relation between 
economic development variables and culture. Culture may affect post-transitional levels of 
democracy directly or indirectly, through economic development. When we use only the 
exogenous portion of culture, we determine if culture can directly affect post-transitional 
democracy or if culture affects the dependent variable through other means.  
 In table 12, I test the robustness of our instrumented cultural variables against economic 
development measures and proxies for colonization/development. Columns (1), (4) and (7) test 
the role of individualism after the inclusion of income per capita. The coefficients on each of the 
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instrumented individualism variables increase after the inclusion of income per capita in the 
model. In column (1), the Hofstede individualism measure is significant at the 1% level while in 
column (7), the Schwartz embededness variable is significant at the 5% level. Each of those 
models has large first stage F-statistics and the null hypothesis of the overidentifying restrictions 
cannot be rejected. In column (4), the WVS measure of individualism is not significant and the 
F-statistic is low. The overidentifying restrictions test shows that the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected at the 5% significance level. Omitting income per capita from the estimation of post-
transitional democracy levels seems to bias the effects of the cultural values down. These results 
tend to support that rising income levels increase people’s taste for government redistribution 
and thus, strengthen attitudes of collectivism. Davis and Knauss (2013) empirically show that 
increases in the WVS individual responsibility measure are negatively related to recent changes 
in the growth rate. In column (1), income per capita is not a significant predictor of  post-
transitional democracy after culture is instrumented for. This would lead to the assumption that 
income per capita is not affecting post-transitional democracy, but rather culture is the  major 
factor when there are changes in income levels associated with post-transitional democracy.  
In columns (2), (5) and (8), the linear primary enrollment rate is included with the 
individualism measures. Upon inclusion of primary enrollment rates, the WVS and Schwartz 
cultural dimension measures are no longer significant and the magnitude on the coefficient drops 
drastically. Furthermore, the null of the overidentifying restrictions test for the WVS 
individualism measure can be rejected at the 10% significance level. The coefficients on the 
Hofstede individualism variable increases in column (1); however, this measure is also less 
accurately specified and significant only at the 10% level. The Schwartz measure is also not a 
significant regressor in column (8). The role of primary enrollment rate does not change from the 
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results shown in table 3.  It is possible that the exogenous portion of culture does not directly 
affect post-transitional levels of democracy; however, the endogenous portion of individualism 
may affect people’s decisions about going to school and getting an education. Both economic 
development measures, however, are still endogenous in these models. Past research has shown 
the links between income and democracy while causal links have been difficult to ascertain.  
 In columns (3), (6) and (9), the robustness of each measure of individualism to the 
inclusion of colonization variables is tested. When compared to the results in Table 3, the 
coefficients on each individualism measure are increased. Each measure is also a significant 
determinant of post-transitional levels of democracy. It is likely that income inequality as picked 
up by differences in the wheat to sugar ratio biases the effects of culture down in the OLS model. 
Here, we find that the portion of culture explained by our instruments still strongly affects post-
transitional democracy when other proxies for colonization history are taken into account. In 
column (6), however, the overidentifying restrictions test’s null hypothesis can be rejected at the 
5% level. Again, there seems to be a weak instrument problem with the WVS individualism 
measure. It is possible that if stronger instruments are utilized in the analysis, that the cultural 
dimension captured by the WVS individualism measure would be even more strongly related to 
post-transitional levels of democracy considering the strong significance of the other cultural 
measures. The effects of the colonization variables match the effects observed in Table 3. The 
wheat to sugar ratio is large in magnitude and negative. Distance from the equator is positive and 
significant in each model. The legal French origin is a marginally significant determinant of 
post-transitional democracy.  
 In each model, the democratic spillover variable is significant and positive. The New 
State dummy is significant in some regressions. In each of these models, we find the exogenous 
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component of culture does seem to matter when determining the level of democracy after 
transitions after controlling for economic development and colonization history. Economic 
development variables are endogenous in each model and more research must be done to 
determine what instruments would be valid to utilize in estimating a strong IV model of post-
transitional democracy.  
Section E3:  Natural Resource, Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization, Islam, Instrumented 
Culture and Transitions 
 As was stated in section D3, natural resources, ethno-linguistic fractionalization and 
religion have been theorized to play a large role in affecting the development of political 
institutions. When testing the exogenous cultural variables against each of these regressors, 
results change drastically.  
 In Table 13 in the appendix, I test the robustness of the individualism measures to the 
inclusion of a natural resource exporters dummy, ethnic fractionalization and the Muslim share 
of the population in 1900. In columns (1), (4) and (7) of table 13, the coefficients on each culture 
variable are similar those found in Table 11. In column (3), we find that the WVS individual 
responsibility variable is significant at the 5% level, but the overidentifying restrictions test is 
rejected at the 10% level and the first stage F-statistic is only at 5.99.  
Interestingly, in each model, the natural resource exporters variable is marginally 
significant or not significant. When controlling for the portion of cultural that guides informal 
decision making, the effect of natural resources are not as important in affecting post-transitional 
democracy levels. It is possible that the presence of natural resources is not a key determinant of 
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democracy. The cultural context in which natural resources are found matters more according to 
this analysis.  
 In columns (2), (5) and (8) table 13, ethnic fractionalization is included in the analysis of 
post-transitional democracy. In each of these models, the effect of culture is significant and 
positive. Each cultural measure is significant in these models, but ethnic fractionalization is not a 
strong predictor of post-transitional democracy. Differences in ethnicity among people within a 
nation may actually be a physical representation of cultural differences. Differences among 
various ethnicities with regards to government may have resulted from deeper cultural 
differences that ultimately resulted in the formation of multiple ethnic groups. In columns (3) 
and (9), the cultural measures are significant to the inclusion of the Muslim share of the 
population in 1900. However, in column (6), the WVS individualism measure is not significant, 
but still highly positive. Again, this variable suffers from a weak instrument problem. 
Furthermore, in these models, we find that the Muslim share is no longer a significant predictor 
of post-transitional levels of democracy. In the OLS regressions, it is possible that the 
endogenous portion of culture related to religious preferences. The exogenous culture as 
explained by our instruments seems to support that religious institutions contain many formal 
and informal norms that develop within society. Culture may affect people’s attitudes towards 
government more so than religion.  
In each model, democratic spillover is a significant, positive predictor of post-transitional 
levels of democracy. Some time period dummies are significant in the models.  
 
 
51	  
 
Section E4:  Composite Model of Instrumented Culture and Transitions  
 To gain a more holistic view of the nature of culture in transitions, a composite model of 
transitions and instrumented cultural dimensions is shown in table 14. In this model, the income 
per capita, distance from the equator, wheat:sugar ratio, natural resources and Muslim share 
variables are included. Income per capita is used in this analysis instead of primary enrollment 
because there are more available observations. This analysis mimics the analysis in Section D3.  
 The effect of culture in these models is larger than in the OLS regressions found in the 
similar analysis in table 7. However, the effect of instrumented culture when including all 
controls is lower than the coefficients found in table 11. In columns (1) and (2) of table 14, the 
effect of culture is positive and significant. When using the Schwartz measure in column (3), the 
effect of culture drops off. However, this may be due to the lack of variation in the data when 
many different variables are included with a limited number of observations. In each model, we 
find that income levels strongly affect post-transitional democracy while the institutional quality 
as determined by a geographic proxy may not affect the post-transitional level of democracy. 
Interestingly, this would make sense because formal institutions break down during transition 
periods. During these political disequilibria, formal institutions should not affect the decision 
making of people within the society. The income inequality as explained by the wheat to sugar 
ratio is still strongly negative and significant.  
 Culture does seem to impact the post-transitional level of democracy even with the 
inclusion of multiple factors. Again, we find that income levels of endogenous in this model. 
Using instruments for income may increase the role of the exogenous form of culture. 
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Section E: Conclusions 
 The results from this section suggest the exogenous portion of culture does matter in 
nations after transitions and that a causal link exists between culture and post-transitional levels 
of democracy. The effect of culture is stronger when instrumenting for the variable using strong 
instruments. Barring the issues of weak instruments, culture does seem to guide people’s 
decision making process after the breakdown of formal institutions.  
Culture may affect democracy by first affecting people’s attitudes towards government 
redistribution. These attitudes would then affect the income per capita in any nation. Primary 
enrollment rate seems to be an important factor affecting post-transitional democracy.  The 
colonization history of any nation also plays a strong role in affecting democracy levels after a 
transition. The wheat to sugar ratio, acting as a proxy for income inequality, is a strong 
determinant of post-transitional democracy levels. The negative sign on the variable also lends 
support to Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) theory of political transition. The results also support 
the idea that natural resource exports are not important predictors of post-transitional levels of 
democracy when controlling for culture. I find a similar result for religion.  
 Using a couple of these models as guides, the post-transitional level of democracy in any 
country can be determined. By adding some Arab Spring nations to our dataset, we can 
determine what the possible future level of democracy in each of these nations will be after their 
respective transitions.  
Section F: Predicting the Level of Democracy in Arab Spring States 
 By adding in some nations that are currently undergoing political transition, we can 
project what the future post-transitional level of democracy using different models. To complete 
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the analysis, I chose to add in nations that are possibly going through a political transition or may 
in the near future. In the dataset, the Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Libya, 
and Mali are included. The post-transitional level of democracy can be determined in each of 
these nations using the separate models of political transition. Using the indicated controls the 
post-transitional level of democracy will is determined. Both instrumented and un-instrumented 
forms of culture are used in the prediction to determine how each plays a role in affecting the 
transitions of these nations. The Schwartz measure will not be used in this analysis because of 
lack of available data for the aforementioned countries.  
 In Table 15 in the appendix, I predict the post-transitional level of democracy for each 
nation using the indicated controls. 5values are generated for each nation, three for different 
Hofstede measures and two for the WVS individualism measures. The previous level of 
democracy, prior to the disequilibrium, is also shown. The largest possible change in post-
transitional democracy is 20 units, a change from a -10 to 10 or vice versa. In each observation, 
there is an increase in the post-transitional democracy from the previous level of democracy. 
Each nation becomes a more democratic state after the political disequilibrium event. For 
example, prior to the political disequilibrium, the democracy level in Egypt is a -3. This is during 
the presidency of Hosni Mubarak. After the recent political transition, the predicted level of 
democracy, as predicted by each model shows an increase in the post-transitional level of 
democracy. Specifically, we find that the composite model and the colonization model show 
high levels of growth. There may be some upward bias in these results because of the high 
magnitude on variables such as the wheat to sugar ratio. Furthermore, the high levels of oil 
wealth in some Arab nations results in an upward bias on the coefficients for income and the 
composite model. We see this in the situation of Kuwait in which the income model predicts an 
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increase in the level of democracy to about 9. This is similar to the democracy found in South 
Africa. However, if we look at the model including the Muslim Share in 1900, the level of 
democracy in Kuwait drops to 2, the same level of democracy found in Pakistan. There are 
significant gains in democracy after political disequilibrium events. Interestingly, if we focus on 
the case of Mali, we see that there is a drop in the overall level of democracy after the current 
civil unrest in the nation. This is interesting because this may represent a move toward a more 
equilibrium position. Mali may have had a higher level of democracy prior to the civil unrest and 
the transition is aiding in moving the country to a point of equilibrium democracy.  
 Using the different models generated throughout this paper, I am able to predict the post-
transitional level of democracy in some of the Arab Spring nations and other nations currently 
facing some political disequilibrium. The results from our models paint an optimistic picture for 
the future of these nations. The democracy levels are expected pick up greatly to the point where 
most nations transition from some type of autocracy toward more democratic government 
institutions. The major factors that may affect this are the cultural dimensions of the nations in 
question, the income levels, the income inequality and the effect of democratic spillover. 
However, our analysis does have some limitations that will be discussed in the next section.  
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Section V: Discussion 
 The recent events of the Arab Spring allow us to ask the question of what happens to 
nations after they undergo some type of political disequilibrium. Past history has shown that 
some nations fall into cycles of weak democracy and autocracy while other nations are able to 
accomplish their goal of establishing a stable democracy. Using econometric techniques, I 
develop a model of post-transitional democracy that can be used to predict the democracy level 
within some of the Arab Spring nations after a point of political transition.  
 Literature on democracy has pointed to various factors affecting the equilibrium level of 
democracy. However, not much literature is available on the variables that affect post-
transitional democracy. In many situations, equilibrium democracy depends on institutional 
quality, economic development, income inequality, natural resource exports, among others. 
However, during political transition, formal institutions tend to break down. During this point, 
past research has shown that people allow informal institutions or cultural norms/mores to guide 
their decision making process. During the period of political transition, it is likely that culture 
acts to guide the development of democracy. Specifically, cultural norms concerning 
individualism and egalitarianism should be particularly important.   
Section A: Summary of Results 
 The analysis I carry out provides evidence for the central hypothesis that culture does 
affect the post-transitional level of democracy. Higher levels of individualism positively affect 
the level of democracy after a revolution, while higher levels of egalitarianism seems to also 
have the same effect. When controlling for income per capita and primary enrollment rate, 
individualism is still a significant and positive predictor of post-transitional levels of democracy. 
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Economic development is also significant in each of the models. Egalitarianism is also robust to 
the inclusion of economic development. Furthermore, both individualism and egalitarianism are 
robust to the inclusion of exogenous measures of institutional quality and income inequality.  
 To control for the possible endogeneity of culture in this model, an IV estimation 
approach is utilized. Three separate instruments for culture from the literature are included in this 
analysis. The WVS measure suffers from some weak instrument problems because there is a low 
F-statistic for this measure and rejection of the overidentifying restrictions test. We continue to 
utilize it in our analysis, but with the knowledge that it suffers from a weak instrument problem. 
The egalitarianism measures do not have strong instruments and are not included in the analysis.  
 Section E outlines the results of the instrumental variable analysis. We find that each of 
our instrumented cultural variables is significant and the coefficients are larger when only the 
exogenous portion of culture is used. Culture may also affect the economic development in 
nations, but also affects decision making. In the IV model, the results support that culture affects 
decision making. Another interesting result is that democratic spillover is highly significant in all 
models. This result supports the idea that there is a positive feedback loop that is generated from 
political transitions. As more nations become democratic, other nations that undergo political 
transition are likely to become more democratic.  
 In the table 15, I use each model to predict the post-transitional level of democracy in 
nations that are currently undergoing political transitions. The results of this analysis provide an 
optimistic view of these transitions. The level of democracy after transitions increases in 
mostnation when using the cultural values model and the controlled models.  
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Section B: Limitations of the Study and Moving Forward 
 The analysis carried out in this paper support the hypothesis that culture matters during 
points of political disequilibrium when formal, government institutions break down dramatically. 
Furthermore, I find that, the exogenous component of culture is still a strong determinant of post-
transitional democracy and robust to the inclusion of economic development, colonization 
history and natural resource measures. In the study, our analysis suffers from some limitations 
mainly based on the availability of cultural data across all nations.  
 From the initial models in table 1, we find that there are approximately 320 points of 
political disequilibrium across all nations. However, once cultural measures are included, the 
total observations are cut by about one-third. This limits the amount of information we can gain 
from all the political disequilibria throughout history. Furthermore, by limiting the total 
observations, it prevents the use of a fixed-effects model because of the limited scope of the 
model we can develop.  
 Beyond the availability of data, there are some issues with the construction of our cultural 
values variables. Survey data is subject to measurement error because the question type and 
method of delivery can affect the answers that are given by respondents. We see this issue arise 
when using the egalitarianism measures. The WVS Respect measure does not seem to be a 
significant predictor of post-transitional democracy. However, the other egalitarianism measures 
affect post-transitional democracy. The construction of the respect question in the WVS is 
different than the other surveys’ questions on egalitarianism. In the WVS, people are asked to 
select five values that are important to teach their children. This question is different than the 
surveys that ask to rate the important of respect for others or tolerance for social hierarchy. 
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Furthermore, there are differences in the effects of each survey measure. This is mainly due to 
measurement error and differences in the answers given by respondents even within the same 
nation.  
 If we consider the instrumental variable approach I used to determine the effect of the 
exogenous component of culture, we find that the WVS measure of individualism suffers from a 
weak instrument problem. The three instruments are not able to overcome some of the issues 
with the low F-statistic or the overidentifying restrcitions test. Furthermore, no instruments have 
been found to strongly associate to the egalitarianism measures. Further research should focus on 
developing instruments for cultural measures so that a causal link between culture and other 
dependent variables can be found.  
 As research using cultural dimensions and political transition continues, we find that 
there are areas of opportunity. One possible point of research involves developing a 
mathematical model that can better explain how culture can affect political transitions and if 
cultural values act as either an impetus for revolution. Furthermore, it may be possible that 
certain aspects of culture would lock people in a state of weak democracy or autocracy instead of 
allowing for political transition. A theoretical model could better elucidate these questions. 
Another area of future work involves determining what causes political disequilibria to happen 
more than a once within a short period of time. In some situations, there are points when a nation 
will undergo a political transition only to undergo another transition within the next 10 years. 
Determining the factors that affect this can allow us to better develop a full picture of political 
transitions.  
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1: The effect of the WVS measure of individualism on the post-transitional level of democracy. The best fit line shows 
that there is some value in analyzing each of these different transitions in a single model. Nation such as Ethiopia and Canada 
have transitions that can be explained using this model, while other transitions such as the one in Austria may not be as easy to 
explain.  
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coef = 1.4082627, (robust) se = .61051445, t = 2.31
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Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Post-Transitional Democracy 319 -0.6897597 6.360024 -10 10 
Extended 19th Century (1800 - 1920) 332 0.2590361 0.4387668 0 1 
Interwar Period (1921-1944) 332 0.1506024 0.3582008 0 1 
Pre-Cold War Era (1945-1989) 332 0.3915663 0.4888373 0 1 
Present (1989 - Present 332 0.1957831 0.3974013 0 1 
New State 332 0.3343373 0.4724704 0 1 
intervention 332 0.1445783 0.352206 0 1 
anarchy 332 0.1054217 0.3075595 0 1 
transition 332 0.4216867 0.4945744 0 1 
Revolutionary Length 213 3.112676 3.545723 1 30 
Total Democratic Nations 332 44.45482 29.1468 2 114 
5 Year Pre-Transition Polity 332 -2.605924 4.615258 -10 10 
Hofstede Individualism 170 39.04706 20.07053 6 90 
Hofstede Power-Distance 170 62.81765 18.57582 11 104 
Schwartz Embededness 111 3.719081 0.3504077 3.097 4.503 
Schwartz Hierarchy 111 2.193937 0.4868836 1.411 3.63 
WVS Individual Responsibility 195 5.13844 0.8661021 3.363566 7.26865 
WVS Respect 180 0.6505347 0.0815766 0.4845 0.8640994 
Linear Income Per Capita 318 7.320795 0.9622043 4.0863 10.77268 
Linear Primary Enrollment Rate 238 50.2516 29.73301 0.8841 99.96667 
Distance from the Equator 202 31.96571 16.22335 0.228 60.212 
log_Wheat:Sugar Ratio 258 0.1115629 0.2101019 -0.3925617 0.5775324 
Legal French Origin 255 0.5176471 0.5006712 0 1 
Natural Resource Exporters 329 0.3768997 0.4853476 0 1 
Ethnic Fractionalization 321 0.4470858 0.2625715 0 0.930175 
Muslim Share in 1900 320 0.2053469 0.3457676 0 1 
East/South Asia 329 0.112462 0.3164153 0 1 
Western Hemisphere 329 0.2066869 0.4055457 0 1 
Europe/Central Asia 329 0.2705167 0.4449034 0 1 
Middle East/Africa 329 0.4012158 0.4908912 0 1 
Genetic Distance from the UK 190 0.085977 0.0478044 0.010034 0.1970938 
Rainfall Variation 204 -0.161802 0.4237379 -0.7607387 0.9523977 
Pronoun Drop 166 0.7349398 0.4427007 0 1 
Table A: Descriptive statistics for each variable used in this analysis are shown above.  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 
       
Extended 19th Century (1800 - 1920) 7.779*** 7.303*** 7.343*** 7.710*** 7.714*** 8.239** 
 (2.416) (2.440) (2.502) (2.447) (2.436) (3.894) 
Interwar Period (1921-1944) 6.680*** 6.038*** 6.063*** 6.521*** 6.343*** 6.601* 
 (2.193) (2.238) (2.269) (2.243) (2.219) (3.486) 
Pre-Cold War Era (1945-1989) 3.579** 3.227** 3.238** 3.513** 3.358** 3.823 
 (1.564) (1.588) (1.599) (1.587) (1.554) (2.505) 
Total Democratic Nations in that Year 0.162*** 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.165*** 0.160*** 0.168*** 
 (0.0282) (0.0287) (0.0289) (0.0294) (0.0283) (0.0437) 
5 Year Pre-Transition Polity  0.107 0.108 0.104 0.118 0.114 
  (0.0784) (0.0784) (0.0788) (0.0811) (0.0807) 
Transition 10 Years Prior -0.534      
 (1.148)      
New State 1.038 0.950 0.927 0.651 1.663*  
 (0.789) (0.781) (0.810) (0.797) (0.944)  
intervention   -0.119    
   (0.986)    
anarchy    -2.037*   
    (1.156)   
transition     1.100  
     (0.852)  
Length of the Transition      -0.121 
      (0.127) 
East and South Asia 3.735*** 3.570*** 3.580*** 3.506*** 3.637*** 1.447 
 (1.110) (1.117) (1.114) (1.116) (1.104) (1.277) 
Western Hemisphere 1.241 1.098 1.095 1.084 1.060 0.292 
 (0.932) (0.944) (0.946) (0.935) (0.940) (1.146) 
Europe and Central Asia 2.098** 1.962** 1.961* 1.982** 1.967** 1.454 
 (1.002) (0.996) (0.997) (0.987) (0.985) (1.349) 
Constant -13.61*** -12.62*** -12.62*** -12.99*** -13.66*** -12.69*** 
 (2.823) (2.944) (2.941) (2.957) (2.993) (4.200) 
       
Observations 316 316 316 316 316 204 
R-squared 0.137 0.142 0.142 0.151 0.147 0.154 
Table 1: A model of political transition is generated in the analysis above. The “Present” time period and “Middle East/Africa” regional dummy are omitted. The number of 
observations and R2 for each model are shown. The previous level of democracy for “New States” was assigned a -2 so as to keep the regressor insignificant. Robust standard 
errors are shown in parenthesis and ***, **, * represent p<0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 respectively.  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 
       
Hofstede Individualism 0.0973***      
 (0.0308)      
WVS Individual Responsibility  1.836***     
  (0.621)     
Schwartz Embededness   -7.503***    
   (2.065)    
Hofstede Power-Distance    -0.0995***   
    (0.0273)   
WVS Respect     9.001  
     (6.624)  
Schwartz Hierarchy      -6.180*** 
      (1.521) 
Extended 19th Century (1800 - 1920) 6.741** 6.947** 11.28*** 7.058*** 6.664** 12.35*** 
 (2.711) (2.687) (4.081) (2.606) (2.821) (3.876) 
Interwar Period (1921-1944) 5.904** 5.268** 10.31*** 5.997** 5.040* 10.25*** 
 (2.492) (2.527) (3.564) (2.365) (2.600) (3.555) 
Pre-Cold War Era (1945-1989) 3.868** 4.397** 8.194*** 3.831** 3.732* 7.600*** 
 (1.821) (1.857) (2.708) (1.733) (2.092) (2.708) 
Total Democratic Nations in that Year 0.183*** 0.193*** 0.272*** 0.188*** 0.175*** 0.278*** 
 (0.0330) (0.0345) (0.0545) (0.0318) (0.0363) (0.0515) 
5 Year Pre-Transition Polity 0.0943 0.107 0.142 0.0947 0.0697 0.0786 
 (0.103) (0.0989) (0.127) (0.106) (0.107) (0.120) 
New State 2.505** 2.555** 5.452*** 2.713** 1.330 3.822*** 
 (1.091) (1.074) (1.366) (1.055) (1.077) (1.370) 
Constant -16.07*** -22.73*** 10.56 -6.689 -17.68*** -4.581 
 (3.272) (4.504) (9.843) (4.154) (5.529) (5.525) 
       
Observations 165 189 111 165 175 111 
R-squared 0.238 0.217 0.349 0.258 0.186 0.373 
Table 2: The effect of each cultural variable on post-transitional levels of democracy is noted above. The time periods are included in the analysis but not show. The “present’ time 
dummy is the omitted group. The number of observations and R2 are shown. Regional variables are included in this model, but not shown. East/South Asia, the Western 
Hemisphere and Europe/Central Asia are included while the Middle East/Africa dummy is excluded. Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis and ***, **, * represent 
p<0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 respectively. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 
          
Hofstede Individualism 0.0778** 0.0757* 0.115***       
 (0.0353) (0.0399) (0.0316)       
WVS Individual Responsibility    1.693*** 1.396** 1.717***    
    (0.580) (0.612) (0.632)    
Schwartz Embededness       -5.627** -5.313** -7.211*** 
       (2.185) (2.445) (2.615) 
Linear ln_Income Per Capita 1.026   1.896***   2.347***   
 (0.770)   (0.580)   (0.850)   
Linear Primary Enrollment Rate  0.0595**   0.0808***   0.104***  
  (0.0285)   (0.0226)   (0.0324)  
Distance from Equator   0.160**   0.175***   0.218*** 
   (0.0618)   (0.0614)   (0.0789) 
log_Wheat:Sugar Ratio   -12.57***   -6.968*   -12.92*** 
   (3.640)   (3.590)   (4.186) 
Legal French Origin   2.399*   1.554   2.485 
   (1.286)   (1.317)   (1.586) 
Extended 19th Century (1800 - 1920) 6.590** 7.497** 6.328** 6.444** 8.921*** 6.594** 10.69*** 12.23** 12.01** 
 (2.689) (3.041) (3.006) (2.617) (2.869) (2.779) (3.926) (4.622) (4.648) 
Interwar Period (1921-1944) 5.306** 6.146** 4.845* 4.094 6.705** 4.617* 9.009** 8.958** 10.43** 
 (2.528) (2.796) (2.696) (2.480) (2.658) (2.645) (3.478) (4.316) (4.009) 
Pre-Cold War Era (1945-1989) 3.310* 4.409** 5.260** 3.276* 4.490** 4.940** 6.352** 5.911* 9.350*** 
 (1.879) (2.213) (2.081) (1.845) (2.224) (1.969) (2.669) (3.243) (3.037) 
Total Democratic Nations in that Year 0.165*** 0.139*** 0.189*** 0.154*** 0.150*** 0.200*** 0.218*** 0.226*** 0.314*** 
 (0.0337) (0.0399) (0.0410) (0.0361) (0.0403) (0.0372) (0.0600) (0.0626) (0.0621) 
5 Year Pre-Transition Polity 0.0800 0.0934 0.0481 0.0671 0.0798 0.0343 0.0837 0.160 0.0329 
 (0.105) (0.115) (0.109) (0.100) (0.103) (0.104) (0.132) (0.145) (0.139) 
New State 2.612** 1.561 2.329** 2.684** 2.171* 2.048* 5.062*** 2.548 5.282*** 
 (1.105) (1.406) (1.118) (1.078) (1.283) (1.211) (1.330) (2.030) (1.619) 
Constant -22.08*** -16.25*** -18.86*** -33.47*** -22.35*** -26.01*** -11.56 -0.405 1.711 
 (5.231) (3.523) (3.612) (5.411) (4.582) (4.877) (11.88) (12.01) (13.27) 
          
Observations 164 120 141 186 142 168 108 79 96 
R-squared 0.243 0.306 0.358 0.254 0.291 0.271 0.378 0.424 0.439 
Table 3: The effect of individualism on post-transitional levels of democracy is noted above. The “Present” time period is omitted. The number of observations and R2 for each 
model are shown. Regional variables are included in this model, but not shown. East/South Asia, the Western Hemisphere and Europe/Central Asia are included while the Middle 
East/Africa dummy is excluded. Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis and ***, **, * represent p<0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 respectively. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 
          
Hofstede Power-Distance -0.0906*** -0.0970*** -0.110***       
 (0.0294) (0.0327) (0.0302)       
WVS Respect    6.708 0.741 12.78*    
    (6.267) (7.794) (6.641)    
Schwartz Hierarchy       -4.260** -5.701*** -5.542*** 
       (1.922) (1.975) (1.930) 
Linear ln_Income Per Capita 1.129   1.726***   2.094*   
 (0.693)   (0.609)   (1.069)   
Linear Primary Enrollment Rate  0.0657**   0.103***   0.0892**  
  (0.0269)   (0.0258)   (0.0347)  
Distance from Equator   0.163***   0.170**   0.209*** 
   (0.0610)   (0.0707)   (0.0734) 
log_Wheat:Sugar Ratio   -12.18***   -5.555   -11.26** 
   (3.695)   (4.282)   (4.353) 
Legal French Origin   3.949***   1.768   2.233 
   (1.299)   (1.414)   (1.722) 
Extended 19th Century (1800 - 1920) 6.726** 7.666** 6.867** 6.748** 9.994*** 2.857 11.58*** 12.88*** 14.73*** 
 (2.636) (3.162) (3.407) (2.764) (3.401) (3.158) (3.784) (4.508) (4.447) 
Interwar Period (1921-1944) 5.232** 5.862** 5.006* 4.319* 7.544** 1.746 9.149*** 8.848** 12.01*** 
 (2.440) (2.903) (2.951) (2.590) (3.146) (3.076) (3.469) (4.193) (4.068) 
Pre-Cold War Era (1945-1989) 3.143* 3.934* 5.280** 3.393 4.774* 0.192 6.308** 6.560** 10.85*** 
 (1.820) (2.218) (2.338) (2.062) (2.643) (2.178) (2.661) (3.168) (2.877) 
Total Democratic Nations in that Year 0.167*** 0.140*** 0.204*** 0.139*** 0.128*** 0.0988*** 0.224*** 0.237*** 0.316*** 
 (0.0330) (0.0401) (0.0436) (0.0383) (0.0460) (0.0267) (0.0642) (0.0676) (0.0587) 
5 Year Pre-Transition Polity 0.0727 0.0808 0.0380 0.0585 0.0752 -0.0105 0.0515 0.135 0.00561 
 (0.105) (0.115) (0.112) (0.105) (0.113) (0.109) (0.128) (0.133) (0.135) 
New State 2.792*** 1.792 2.927** 1.721 1.670 0.802 3.902*** 1.530 3.576** 
 (1.050) (1.327) (1.164) (1.100) (1.362) (1.241) (1.318) (1.941) (1.565) 
Constant -14.43** -7.558 -10.37** -27.58*** -16.26*** -22.47*** -22.03** -8.345 -15.24** 
 (6.559) (4.767) (4.922) (5.589) (6.067) (6.211) (9.906) (6.583) (6.992) 
          
Observations 164 120 141 174 127 157 108 79 96 
R-squared 0.269 0.345 0.369 0.217 0.287 0.245 0.378 0.460 0.449 
Table 4: The effect of egalitarianism on post-transitional levels of democracy with the included controls is noted above. The “Present” time period is omitted. The number of 
observations and R2 are shown. Regional variables are included in this model, but not shown. East/South Asia, the Western Hemisphere and Europe/Central Asia are included 
while the Middle East/Africa dummy is excluded. Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis and ***, **, * represent p<0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 respectively. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 
          
Hofstede Individualism 0.0881*** 0.0900*** 0.0915***       
 (0.0309) (0.0309) (0.0308)       
WVS Individual Responsibility    1.808*** 1.743*** 1.321**    
    (0.598) (0.611) (0.632)    
Schwartz Embededness       -7.260*** -7.192*** -8.042*** 
       (2.119) (2.350) (2.164) 
Natural Resource Exporters -2.396*   -2.887**   -0.870   
 (1.305)   (1.220)   (1.832)   
Ethnic Fractionalization  -2.000   -2.656   -0.903  
  (2.243)   (2.099)   (3.586)  
Muslim Share in 1900   -5.791***   -4.948***   3.796 
   (1.977)   (1.826)   (4.408) 
Extended 19th Century (1800 - 1920) 6.763** 6.265** 7.241*** 7.217*** 6.585** 7.712*** 11.01*** 11.02** 10.54** 
 (2.759) (2.789) (2.617) (2.551) (2.721) (2.478) (4.154) (4.340) (4.354) 
Interwar Period (1921-1944) 6.022** 5.398** 6.709*** 5.562** 4.853* 6.363*** 10.08*** 10.05** 9.587** 
 (2.514) (2.573) (2.453) (2.448) (2.557) (2.407) (3.622) (3.831) (3.803) 
Pre-Cold War Era (1945-1989) 4.092** 3.653** 4.503** 4.815*** 4.311** 4.896*** 8.034*** 8.016*** 7.495** 
 (1.885) (1.835) (1.743) (1.808) (1.855) (1.735) (2.726) (2.873) (2.924) 
Total Democratic Nations in that Year 0.188*** 0.182*** 0.192*** 0.203*** 0.194*** 0.202*** 0.271*** 0.270*** 0.269*** 
 (0.0336) (0.0335) (0.0329) (0.0334) (0.0343) (0.0328) (0.0546) (0.0561) (0.0559) 
5 Year Pre-Transition Polity 0.0721 0.0974 0.0867 0.0816 0.110 0.0918 0.138 0.140 0.139 
 (0.106) (0.104) (0.105) (0.101) (0.0992) (0.0994) (0.127) (0.127) (0.127) 
New State 2.585** 2.586** 3.108*** 2.519** 2.610** 2.956*** 5.392*** 5.453*** 5.225*** 
 (1.051) (1.086) (1.062) (1.050) (1.081) (1.040) (1.400) (1.367) (1.426) 
Constant -15.19*** -14.61*** -14.91*** -21.90*** -20.81*** -19.83*** 10.15 9.934 13.04 
 (3.419) (3.743) (3.178) (4.467) (4.713) (4.463) (9.858) (9.923) (10.54) 
          
Observations 165 165 165 189 189 189 111 111 111 
R-squared 0.253 0.242 0.282 0.240 0.224 0.247 0.350 0.349 0.354 
Table 5: The effect of individualism on post-transitional levels of democracy with the included controls is noted above. The “Present” time period is omitted. The number of 
observations and R2 are shown. Regional variables are included in this model, but not shown. East/South Asia, the Western Hemisphere and Europe/Central Asia are included 
while the Middle East/Africa dummy is excluded. Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis and ***, **, * represent p<0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 respectively. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 
          
Hofstede Power-Distance -0.0978*** -0.0946*** -0.0880***       
 (0.0269) (0.0272) (0.0275)       
WVS Respect    12.13* 8.993 10.36    
    (6.294) (6.807) (6.679)    
Schwartz Hierarchy       -6.002*** -5.848*** -6.812*** 
       (1.528) (1.694) (1.394) 
Natural Resource Exporters -2.796**   -3.470**   -1.553   
 (1.215)   (1.391)   (1.767)   
Ethnic Fractionalization  -1.947   -2.486   -1.644  
  (2.226)   (2.363)   (3.329)  
Muslim Share in 1900   -5.173***   -8.014***   5.337 
   (1.822)   (1.966)   (4.903) 
Extended 19th Century (1800 - 1920) 6.987*** 6.556** 7.529*** 7.278*** 5.985** 7.415*** 11.84*** 11.82*** 11.42*** 
 (2.621) (2.697) (2.496) (2.647) (2.853) (2.431) (3.990) (4.197) (4.103) 
Interwar Period (1921-1944) 6.070** 5.484** 6.747*** 5.594** 4.462* 6.568*** 9.828*** 9.767** 9.225** 
 (2.369) (2.451) (2.326) (2.497) (2.637) (2.366) (3.615) (3.828) (3.740) 
Pre-Cold War Era (1945-1989) 4.043** 3.611** 4.437*** 4.524** 3.500* 4.817** 7.344*** 7.317** 6.557** 
 (1.776) (1.735) (1.674) (2.039) (2.106) (1.863) (2.716) (2.786) (2.906) 
Total Democratic Nations in that Year 0.193*** 0.187*** 0.196*** 0.189*** 0.172*** 0.193*** 0.277*** 0.275*** 0.274*** 
 (0.0319) (0.0320) (0.0313) (0.0347) (0.0365) (0.0335) (0.0521) (0.0535) (0.0526) 
5 Year Pre-Transition Polity 0.0647 0.0967 0.0908 0.0489 0.0697 0.0337 0.0755 0.0800 0.0679 
 (0.109) (0.107) (0.106) (0.107) (0.109) (0.110) (0.122) (0.121) (0.119) 
New State 2.790*** 2.779*** 3.236*** 1.385 1.483 2.531** 3.809*** 3.947*** 3.338** 
 (1.011) (1.052) (1.052) (1.044) (1.116) (1.044) (1.340) (1.336) (1.484) 
Constant -6.047 -5.785 -6.590* -19.45*** -16.05*** -17.44*** -4.100 -4.329 -2.604 
 (4.169) (4.423) (3.976) (5.040) (5.934) (5.291) (5.608) (5.609) (5.757) 
          
Observations 165 165 165 175 171 168 111 111 111 
R-squared 0.279 0.261 0.292 0.216 0.188 0.266 0.377 0.374 0.382 
Table 6: The effect of egalitarianism on post-transitional levels of democracy with the included controls is noted above. The “Present” time period is omitted. The number of 
observations and R2 are shown. Regional variables are included in this model, but not shown. East/South Asia, the Western Hemisphere and Europe/Central Asia are included 
while the Middle East/Africa dummy is excluded. Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis and ***, **, * represent p<0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 respectively. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 
       
Hofstede Individualism 0.0801**      
 (0.0358)      
WVS Individual Responsibility  1.246**     
  (0.578)     
Schwartz Embededness   -5.895**    
   (2.841)    
Hofstede Power-Distance    -0.0668**   
    (0.0302)   
WVS Respect     8.290  
     (6.243)  
Schwartz Hierarchy      -5.051** 
      (2.235) 
Linear ln_Income Per Capita 2.271*** 2.582*** 2.419** 2.484*** 2.590*** 1.813 
 (0.761) (0.653) (0.965) (0.750) (0.692) (1.274) 
Distance from Equator 0.0909 0.105* 0.145* 0.0887 0.0817 0.148** 
 (0.0617) (0.0614) (0.0822) (0.0607) (0.0664) (0.0734) 
log_Wheat:Sugar Ratio -12.81*** -10.07*** -13.33*** -12.81*** -10.24*** -11.84*** 
 (3.441) (3.183) (4.133) (3.504) (3.538) (4.267) 
Natural Resource Exporters -0.829 -0.485 -1.072 -1.206 -1.305 -1.896 
 (1.433) (1.324) (2.041) (1.353) (1.498) (1.922) 
Muslim Share in 1900 -0.598 -3.732 1.806 -0.916 -6.592*** 3.719 
 (2.598) (2.536) (5.185) (2.418) (2.502) (5.587) 
Total Democratic Nations in that Year 0.146*** 0.158*** 0.239*** 0.146*** 0.156*** 0.256*** 
 (0.0408) (0.0365) (0.0631) (0.0412) (0.0382) (0.0665) 
5 Year Pre-Transition Polity 0.0496 0.0187 0.0526 0.0494 0.00547 0.0227 
 (0.111) (0.104) (0.135) (0.114) (0.111) (0.131) 
New State 2.686** 2.838*** 4.555*** 2.901*** 2.954*** 3.050** 
 (1.103) (1.056) (1.534) (1.109) (1.060) (1.472) 
Constant -28.20*** -36.23*** -13.66 -22.80*** -34.37*** -21.49* 
 (5.331) (5.665) (14.72) (6.794) (5.744) (12.27) 
       
Observations 145 173 101 145 156 101 
R-squared 0.365 0.330 0.438 0.367 0.337 0.445 
Table 7: The effect of individualism and egalitarianism on post-transitional levels of democracy with the included controls is noted above. The time period dummies are included 
with the omitted dummy being the “Present” time. The number of observations and R2 are shown. Regional variables are included in this model, but not shown. East/South Asia, 
the Western Hemisphere and Europe/Central Asia are included while the Middle East/Africa dummy is excluded. Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis and ***, **, * 
represent p<0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 respectively. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES hof_idv hof_idv hof_idv hof_idv 
     
Genetic Distance from United Kingdom -213.9***   -209.9*** 
 (32.04)   (23.27) 
ln_Covariance of Rainfall  -4.657   
  (3.786)   
Pronoun Drop   -18.26*** -17.98*** 
   (4.191) (2.992) 
Extended 19th Century (1800 - 1920) 14.19 11.15 11.98* 14.69** 
 (9.284) (11.42) (6.707) (6.229) 
Interwar Period (1921-1944) 11.00 7.950 10.63* 13.35** 
 (8.011) (9.798) (6.023) (5.639) 
Pre-Cold War Era (1945-1989) 9.081 5.845 5.967 8.617* 
 (6.703) (7.806) (4.971) (4.935) 
Total Democratic Nations in that Year 0.235** 0.0786 0.0658 0.216*** 
 (0.111) (0.124) (0.0694) (0.0732) 
5 Year Pre-Transition Polity 0.359* 0.424** 0.205 0.0319 
 (0.194) (0.201) (0.182) (0.165) 
New State 4.397 1.891 1.459 3.451 
 (2.843) (3.389) (2.937) (2.550) 
Constant 31.23*** 23.74* 35.88*** 43.71*** 
 (11.02) (13.31) (8.787) (8.312) 
     
Observations 152 160 157 144 
R-squared 0.646 0.531 0.628 0.745 
F-Statistic 38.86 21.96 42.88 54.07 
OIR Test    0.8762 
Table 8: The effect of the three different instruments on Hofstede measures of individualism are noted above. The time period dummies are included with the omitted dummy 
being the “Present” time. The number of observations and R2 are shown. Also, the p-value for the overidentifying restrictions test is shown along with the First Stage F-statistic. 
Regional variables are included in this model, but not shown. East/South Asia, the Western Hemisphere and Europe/Central Asia are included while the Middle East/Africa 
dummy is excluded. Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis and ***, **, * represent p<0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 respectively. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES wvs_indresp wvs_indresp wvs_indresp wvs_indresp 
     
Genetic Distance from United Kingdom -2.128    
 (1.293)    
ln_Covariance of Rainfall  -0.704***  -0.847*** 
  (0.165)  (0.235) 
Pronoun Drop   -0.737*** -0.504*** 
   (0.156) (0.166) 
Extended 19th Century (1800 - 1920) -0.219 -0.0534 -0.559 -0.406 
 (0.374) (0.354) (0.396) (0.350) 
Interwar Period (1921-1944) -0.243 -0.0332 -0.471 -0.280 
 (0.359) (0.330) (0.381) (0.329) 
Pre-Cold War Era (1945-1989) -0.321 -0.230 -0.644* -0.559* 
 (0.275) (0.262) (0.333) (0.297) 
Total Democratic Nations in that Year -0.0122*** -0.00993** -0.0136*** -0.0104*** 
 (0.00455) (0.00423) (0.00433) (0.00380) 
5-Year Pre-Transition Polity 0.00152 -0.00364 -0.00580 -0.00772 
 (0.0118) (0.0112) (0.0113) (0.0112) 
New State -0.458*** -0.430*** -0.361** -0.288** 
 (0.135) (0.126) (0.145) (0.139) 
Constant 5.910*** 5.625*** 6.584*** 6.333*** 
 (0.483) (0.430) (0.482) (0.428) 
     
Observations 188 193 151 151 
R-squared 0.265 0.322 0.327 0.395 
F-Statistic 7.24 7.83 6.76 8.36 
OIR Test    0.1571 
Table 9: The effect of the three instruments on WVS measures of individualism are noted above. The time period dummies are included with the omitted dummy being the 
“Present” time. The number of observations and R2 are shown. Also, the p-value for the overidentifying restrictions test is shown along with the First Stage F-statistic. Regional 
variables are included in this model, but not shown. East/South Asia, the Western Hemisphere and Europe/Central Asia are included while the Middle East/Africa dummy is 
excluded. Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis and ***, **, * represent p<0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 respectively. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES schw_embed schw_embed schw_embed schw_embed 
     
Genetic Distance from United Kingdom 4.712***   4.745*** 
 (0.762)   (0.975) 
ln_Covariance of Rainfall  0.0579   
  (0.102)   
Pronoun Drop   0.207** 0.189*** 
   (0.0866) (0.0671) 
Extended 19th Century (1800 - 1920) 0.0199 -0.0604 -0.115 0.102 
 (0.218) (0.279) (0.394) (0.264) 
Interwar Period (1921-1944) 0.0670 -0.0343 -0.0715 0.153 
 (0.183) (0.230) (0.365) (0.239) 
Pre-Cold War Era (1945-1989) 0.113 0.0590 -0.0299 0.167 
 (0.157) (0.199) (0.351) (0.221) 
Total Democratic Nations in that Year 0.00508* 0.00548 0.00630* 0.00587** 
 (0.00282) (0.00393) (0.00354) (0.00246) 
New State 0.00226 0.00445 0.000568 -0.000403 
 (0.00448) (0.00591) (0.00506) (0.00358) 
5 Year Pre-Transition Polity 0.183*** 0.213*** 0.253*** 0.197*** 
 (0.0565) (0.0637) (0.0606) (0.0602) 
Constant 3.167*** 3.563*** 3.385*** 2.913*** 
 (0.250) (0.338) (0.426) (0.269) 
     
Observations 100 111 97 92 
R-squared 0.606 0.380 0.454 0.674 
F-Statistic 15.45 7.66 11.18 18.78 
OIR Test    0.7238 
Table 10: The effect of the three instruments on Schwartz measures of individualism are noted above. The time period dummies are included with the omitted dummy being the 
“Present” time. The number of observations and R2 are shown. Also, the p-value for the overidentifying restrictions test is shown along with the First Stage F-statistic. Regional 
variables are included in this model, but not shown. East/South Asia, the Western Hemisphere and Europe/Central Asia are included while the Middle East/Africa dummy is 
excluded. Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis and ***, **, * represent p<0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 respectively. 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES pp5 pp5 pp5 
    
Hofstede Individualism 0.174***   
 (0.0467)   
WVS Individual Responsibility  2.775**  
  (1.414)  
Schwartz Embededness   -13.39*** 
   (3.191) 
Extended 19th Century (1800 - 1920) 3.347 8.185*** 11.72*** 
 (2.786) (2.626) (4.449) 
Interwar Period (1921-1944) 3.009 7.278*** 11.80*** 
 (2.578) (2.512) (3.981) 
Pre-Cold War Era (1945-1989) 1.996 5.481*** 9.879*** 
 (2.103) (1.974) (3.319) 
Total Democratic Nations in that Year 0.152*** 0.213*** 0.301*** 
 (0.0363) (0.0344) (0.0636) 
5 Year Pre-Transition Polity 0.0489 0.124 0.00750 
 (0.108) (0.106) (0.138) 
New State 2.023* 3.151** 6.640*** 
 (1.120) (1.248) (1.394) 
East and South Asia 3.423** 2.131 3.581 
 (1.488) (1.707) (2.209) 
Western Hemisphere 0.485 -0.482 -1.444 
 (1.563) (1.481) (2.007) 
Europe and Central Asia -2.306 0.544 -1.739 
 (1.778) (1.679) (1.781) 
Constant -14.30*** -28.95*** 29.74** 
 (3.413) (8.328) (11.95) 
    
Observations 141 148 92 
R-squared 0.225 0.181 0.374 
First Stage F-Statistic 54.07 8.36 18.78 
OIR Test p-value 0.8762 0.1571 0.7238 
Table 11: The effect of instrumented individualism on post-transitional levels of democracy. The “Present” time period is omitted. The number of observations and R2 are shown. 
The first stage F-statistic and p-value from the overidentifying restrictions test is shown as well. Regional variables are included in this model, but not shown. East/South Asia, the 
Western Hemisphere and Europe/Central Asia are included while the Middle East/Africa dummy is excluded. Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis and ***, **, * 
represent p<0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 respectively. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 
          
Hofstede Individualism 0.149*** 0.114* 0.166***       
 (0.0578) (0.0645) (0.0458)       
WVS Individual Responsibility    2.161 1.352 3.314***    
    (1.374) (1.269) (1.058)    
Schwartz Embededness       -8.191** -4.037 -12.88*** 
       (3.576) (5.186) (4.614) 
Linear ln_Income Per Capita 1.101   2.471***   2.828***   
 (0.893)   (0.672)   (0.922)   
Linear Primary Enrollment Rate  0.0589*   0.0824***   0.135***  
  (0.0356)   (0.0243)   (0.0424)  
Distance from Equator   0.131**   0.215***   0.142 
   (0.0658)   (0.0574)   (0.105) 
log_Wheat:Sugar Ratio   -12.63***   -10.88***   -11.85*** 
   (3.601)   (3.903)   (4.353) 
Legal French Origin   2.108*   2.485*   1.859 
   (1.253)   (1.316)   (1.745) 
Extended 19th Century (1800 - 1920) 3.004 5.620* 3.431 6.078** 8.111*** 7.636*** 9.476** 15.46*** 10.89** 
 (2.671) (2.908) (2.833) (2.547) (2.688) (2.713) (4.489) (5.914) (5.215) 
Interwar Period (1921-1944) 2.330 4.693* 2.801 4.580* 6.765*** 6.647*** 8.673** 12.35** 10.30** 
 (2.478) (2.675) (2.596) (2.443) (2.485) (2.538) (4.283) (5.548) (4.754) 
Pre-Cold War Era (1945-1989) 1.333 3.616 3.804* 3.050 4.457* 6.920*** 6.577* 7.689* 9.417** 
 (2.002) (2.476) (2.106) (1.961) (2.318) (1.974) (3.739) (3.991) (3.734) 
Total Democratic Nations in that Year 0.134*** 0.126*** 0.153*** 0.155*** 0.147*** 0.226*** 0.212*** 0.203** 0.335*** 
 (0.0373) (0.0418) (0.0402) (0.0379) (0.0425) (0.0358) (0.0737) (0.101) (0.0700) 
5 Year Pre-Transition Polity 0.0330 0.102 0.00697 0.0597 0.125 0.0529 -0.0227 0.139 -0.0841 
 (0.108) (0.113) (0.109) (0.105) (0.109) (0.110) (0.133) (0.153) (0.156) 
New State 2.304** 1.291 2.098* 3.510*** 2.511 3.837*** 6.017*** 1.856 6.707*** 
 (1.132) (1.450) (1.115) (1.177) (1.623) (1.299) (1.321) (2.239) (1.709) 
Constant -20.64*** -14.62*** -16.35*** -40.08*** -21.42*** -37.21*** -5.889 -8.274 24.19 
 (5.789) (3.449) (3.463) (8.220) (7.743) (6.336) (15.56) (19.18) (19.23) 
          
Observations 141 105 131 147 109 138 92 68 86 
R-squared 0.247 0.323 0.337 0.282 0.341 0.305 0.410 0.422 0.445 
First Stage F-Statistic 58.17 62..08 51.69 6.13 7.84 7.48 18.21 175.19 148.48 
OIR Test p-value 0.6385 0.3300 0.2944 0.1321 0.0742 0.0508 0.9960 0.8680 0.6818 
Table 12: The effect of instrumented individualism on post-transitional levels of democracy when included with economic development and colonization variables. The “Present” 
time period is omitted. The number of observations and R2 are shown. The first stage F-statistic and p-value from the overidentifying restrictions test is shown as well. Regional 
variables are included in this model, but not shown. East/South Asia, the Western Hemisphere and Europe/Central Asia are included while the Middle East/Africa dummy is 
excluded. Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis and ***, **, * represent p<0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 respectively. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 pp5 
          
Hofstede Individualism 0.163*** 0.167*** 0.147***       
 (0.0454) (0.0479) (0.0433)       
WVS Individual Responsibility    2.965** 2.480* 2.282    
    (1.374) (1.449) (1.746)    
Schwartz Embededness       -13.32*** -14.30*** -15.06*** 
       (3.128) (4.293) (3.679) 
Natural Resource Exporters -2.797*   -2.773*   -1.856   
 (1.457)   (1.457)   (1.940)   
Ethnic Fractionalization  -1.413   -3.232   2.367  
  (2.408)   (2.371)   (4.445)  
Muslim Share in 1900   -3.363   -1.813   6.888 
   (2.486)   (2.868)   (4.600) 
Extended 19th Century (1800 - 1920) 3.511 3.178 4.501 8.187*** 7.391*** 8.294*** 10.97** 12.57*** 10.45** 
 (2.556) (2.753) (2.783) (2.472) (2.659) (2.596) (4.620) (4.805) (4.884) 
Interwar Period (1921-1944) 3.246 2.806 4.213 7.404*** 6.459** 7.451*** 11.18*** 12.62*** 10.60** 
 (2.397) (2.564) (2.668) (2.398) (2.545) (2.492) (4.137) (4.339) (4.320) 
Pre-Cold War Era (1945-1989) 2.300 1.967 2.871 5.643*** 5.083** 5.440*** 9.419*** 10.40*** 8.674** 
 (1.974) (2.051) (2.113) (1.896) (1.983) (1.973) (3.485) (3.567) (3.611) 
Total Democratic Nations in that Year 0.163*** 0.153*** 0.165*** 0.224*** 0.210*** 0.214*** 0.302*** 0.310*** 0.300*** 
 (0.0350) (0.0360) (0.0357) (0.0331) (0.0341) (0.0338) (0.0626) (0.0688) (0.0667) 
5 Year Pre-Transition Polity 0.0205 0.0498 0.0607 0.0910 0.122 0.127 -0.00485 0.0107 -0.00984 
 (0.110) (0.108) (0.107) (0.110) (0.107) (0.106) (0.138) (0.139) (0.137) 
New State 2.233** 2.082* 2.433** 3.363*** 3.171** 3.157** 6.664*** 6.581*** 6.414*** 
 (1.058) (1.118) (1.160) (1.191) (1.241) (1.265) (1.344) (1.381) (1.405) 
Constant -13.36*** -13.43*** -13.88*** -29.26*** -25.43*** -26.02** 30.45*** 31.59** 36.37*** 
 (3.272) (3.753) (3.231) (8.135) (9.053) (10.27) (11.70) (13.87) (13.99) 
          
Observations 141 141 141 148 148 148 92 92 92 
R-squared 0.249 0.230 0.292 0.234 0.236 0.232 0.379 0.373 0.386 
First Stage F-Statistic 52.83 48.58 56.45 5.99 6.05 6.25 18.81 20.64 16.97 
OIR Test p-value 0.4702 0.7391 0.9207 0.0683 0.0680 0.0973 0.8607 0.6906 0.8942 
Table 13: The effect of instrumented individualism on post-transitional levels of democracy when included with natural resources, ethnic fractionalization and the Muslim share in 
1900. The “Present” time period is omitted. The number of observations and R2 are shown. The first stage F-statistic and p-value from the overidentifying restrictions test is shown 
as well. Regional variables are included in this model, but not shown. East/South Asia, the Western Hemisphere and Europe/Central Asia are included while the Middle 
East/Africa dummy is excluded. Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis and ***, **, * represent p<0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 respectively. 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES pp5 pp5 pp5 
    
Hofstede Individualism 0.117**   
 (0.0547)   
WVS Individual Responsibility  2.313*  
  (1.321)  
Schwartz Embededness   -8.323 
   (5.304) 
Linear ln_Income Per Capita 2.321*** 3.202*** 3.137*** 
 (0.712) (0.641) (1.007) 
Distance from Equator 0.0687 0.105* 0.0947 
 (0.0637) (0.0567) (0.0866) 
log_Wheat:Sugar Ratio -12.65*** -11.98*** -12.10*** 
 (3.340) (3.466) (3.925) 
Natural Resource Exporters -0.657 0.00994 -1.576 
 (1.454) (1.392) (2.026) 
Muslim Share in 1900 0.00286 1.816 2.693 
 (2.531) (3.006) (5.350) 
Total Democratic Nations in that Year 0.115*** 0.141*** 0.218*** 
 (0.0389) (0.0369) (0.0835) 
5 Year Pre-Transition Polity 0.0117 0.0327 -0.0522 
 (0.108) (0.107) (0.134) 
New State 2.578** 3.579*** 5.454*** 
 (1.059) (1.098) (1.366) 
Constant -26.56*** -45.92*** -6.973 
 (5.101) (8.570) (22.84) 
    
Observations 136 142 91 
R-squared 0.362 0.372 0.472 
First Stage F- Statistic 48.75 7.62 22.15 
OIR Test p-value 0.4641 0.1617 0.5324 
Table 14: The effect of instrumented individualism on post-transitional levels of democracy when included with multiple controls. The time period variables are included but not 
shown, and the “Present” time period is omitted. The number of observations and R2 are shown. The first stage F-statistic and p-value from the overidentifying restrictions test is 
shown as well. Regional variables are included in this model, but not shown. East/South Asia, the Western Hemisphere and Europe/Central Asia are included while the Middle 
East/Africa dummy is excluded. Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis and ***, **, * represent p<0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 respectively. 
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Nation Included 
Control 
Previous 
Level of 
Democracy 
Predicted Post-
Transitional Level of 
Democracy (Hofstede 
Individualism) 
Predicted Post-
Transitional Level of 
Democracy (Hofstede 
Power-Distance) 
Predicted Post-
Transitional Level 
of Democracy 
(WVS) 
Predicted Post-
Transitional Level of 
Democracy 
(Instrumented Hofstede) 
Predicted Post-
Transitional Level of 
Democracy 
(Instrumented WVS) 
Egypt Income -3 7.27 7.77 6.55 7.66 6.82 
Egypt Primary 
Enrollment 
-3 6.41 7.16 6.91 7.45 7.27 
Egypt 
Colonization 
History 
-3 12.63 13.88 10 11.28 9.91 
Egypt 
Muslim Share 
in 1900 
-3 4.29 5.09 3.92 5.74 5.12 
Egypt 
Natural 
Resources 
-3 8.23 8.97 7.88 9.27 7.23 
Egypt 
Composite 
Model 
-3 11.98 12.31 8.72 11.39 10.86 
Iran Income -6.6 8.91 9.35 8.94 10.66 9.99 
Iran 
Primary 
Enrollment 
-6.6 8.01 8.83 8.73 9.64 8.91 
Iran 
Muslim Share 
in 1900 
-6.6 4.45 4.94 3.81 7.3 6.18 
Iran 
Natural 
Resources 
-6.6 6.98 7.11 6.15 9 6.5 
Iraq Income 3 7.61 5.36 5.63 8.03 5.46 
 
Iraq 
Primary 
Enrollment 
3 7.85 5.78 7.8 9.14 8.45 
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Iraq 
Colonization 
History 
3 11.98 9.91 9.3 10.53 8.49 
Iraq 
Muslim Share 
in 1900 
3 4.78 3 3.79 6.55 5.26 
Iraq 
Natural 
Resources 
3 6.7 4.11 5.12 7.41 4.4 
Iraq 
Composite 
Model 
3 8.84 6.58 5.16 8.36 7.49 
Jordan Income -3 
  
6.32 
  
Jordan 
Primary 
Enrollment 
-3 
  
7.07 
 
7.44 
Jordan 
Colonization 
History 
-3 
  
10.06 
 
9.85 
Jordan 
Muslim Share 
in 1900 
-3 
  
3.14 
 
4.66 
Jordan 
Natural 
Resources 
-3 
  
4.82 
 
4.17 
Jordan 
Composite 
Model 
-3 
  
7.64 
 
10.82 
Kuwait Income -7 9.2 8.14 
 
9.94 6.52 
Kuwait 
Primary 
Enrollment 
-7 6.5 5.41 
 
7.51 
 
Kuwait 
Muslim Share 
in 1900 
-7 2.86 2.01 
 
4.87 
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Kuwait 
Natural 
Resources 
-7 7.94 6.75 
 
9.2 
 
Kyrgyzstan Income -2 
  
4.4 
 
3.57 
Kyrgyzstan 
Primary 
Enrollment 
-2 
  
6.08 
 
6.44 
Kyrgyzstan 
Colonization 
History 
-2 
  
8.91 
 
7.06 
Kyrgyzstan 
Muslim Share 
in 1900 
-2 
  
3.53 
 
4.9 
Kyrgyzstan 
Natural 
Resources 
-2 
  
7.84 
 
6.12 
Kyrgyzstan 
Composite 
Model 
-2 
  
4.26 
 
6.64 
Libya Income -7 9.02 7.74 
 
10.6 
 
Libya 
Primary 
Enrollment 
-7 7.69 6.61 
 
9.2 
 
Libya 
Muslim Share 
in 1900 
-7 4.39 3.19 
 
6.98 
 
Libya 
Natural 
Resources 
-7 6.69 4.93 
 
8.5 
 
Mali Income 7 
  
6.19 
 
6 
Mali Primary 
Enrollment 
7 
  
7.64 
 
8.6 
Mali Colonization 
History 
7 
  
9.55 
 
11.07 
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Mali 
Muslim Share 
in 1900 
7 
  
9.12 
 
10.33 
Mali 
Natural 
Resources 
7 
  
8.2 
 
9.29 
Mali 
Composite 
Model 
7 
  
5.67 
 
5.95 
Table15: The post-transitional level of democracy in the above countries is predicted using 5 different models of post-political transition. Five different models are used because of 
the high level of model uncertainty. Each model predicts that there should be increases in the level of democracy in many of the Arab Spring nations after political transitions. 
 
 
 
 
 
